The Rights of War and Peace: In Three Volumes

Chapter I. Certain General Rules, shewing what, by the Law of Nature, is allowable in War; where also the Author treats of Deceit and Lying

1185 Book III u c h a p t e r i u Certain General Rules, shewing what, by the Law of Nature, is allowable in War; where also the Author treats of Deceit and Lying. I. We have already seen, not only who may make War, but for what Reasons too they are permitted to engage in it. We are now to enquire 1 what is allowable in War, and how far, and in what Circumstances it is so. And this we must consider, either simply in itself, or with Regard to some antecedent Promise. What is simply in itself allowable in War, shall be considered first from the Law of Nature, and then from that of Nations. To begin with what Nature allows. I. (1) St. Augustin says, that in the midst of War itself, Faith is to be observed, and Peace endeavoured, Ut in ipsis bellis, &c. Ad Bonifac. Comit. Epist. LXX. Esto ergo, etiam bellando, pacificus, Epist. CCV. Ad eundum Bonifac. There is in Procopius , Vandalic. Lib. I. (Cap. XVI.) a fine Discourse of Belisarius to his Soldiers, wherein he shews, that those who make War, ought not to abandon Justice. Paulus Orosius says, that Civil Wars are made in this Manner, when unavoidable,byChristian Princes, in the Times of Christianity. Ecce, Regibus & temporibusChristianis,&c. Lib. VII. The same Historian, speaking of Theodosius, defies all the World to instance , from the first founding of Rome, a single War undertaken so justly and so necessarily, and so successfully terminated, through the divine Providence, that neither the Battles, during it, had been very bloody, nor Victory attended with cruel Revenge. Grotius. I. The Subject and Design of this Book. 1186 chapter i II. 1. And here we must observe, First, That in Things of amoralNature, as we have often said before, 1 those a Means which conduce to a certain End, do assume the very Nature of that End: And therefore we are supposed to be authorised to employ those Things, which are (in a moral, not a physical Sense) 2 necessary to the obtaining our just Rights. By Right I understand what is strictly so called, and imports that3 Power of acting which is intirely founded on the Good of Society. Wherefore, as we have remarked elsewhere, b if I cannot otherwise save my Life, I may, by any Force whatever, repel him who attempts it, tho’, perhaps, he who does so is not any ways to blame. Because this Right does not properly arise from the other’s Crime, but from that Prerogative with which Nature has invested me, of defending myself. 2. By which also I am impowered to invade and seize upon what belongstoanother ,withoutconsideringwhetherhebeinfaultorno,whenever what is his threatens me c with any imminent Danger; but I am not to claim a Property in it, for that is not necessary to the End in Question, but only to detain it till my Security be sufficiently provided for; as we have elsewhere d declared. So by the Law of Nature I have a Right to take from any one what he has of mine, 4 and if this cannot easily be II. (1) See B. II. Chap. V. § 24. Num. 2. and Chap. VII. § 2. Num. 3. 2. Our Author does not mean Things essentially bad, and which, as such, cannot be lawful in any Case, or to any End whatsoever; but only those, which a Man could not do otherwise, without the necessary Connection they have with a lawful End. See what he says afterwards, at the End of Paragraph 6. Things bad in their Nature are indeed generally not necessary, with Regard to the Necessity in Question. But, admitting they were, as that is not impossible; and that a Person, for Instance, could not obtain or preserve his just Rights but by Adultery, Blasphemy, Sacrilege, Abjurationof the Religionhebelievestrue;theInnocenceof theEndwouldneitherhinder the Means from being utterly unlawful, nor discharge him from the Obligation of renouncing the most lawful Pretensions, rather than to employ such Means. 3. Facultatem agendi in solo Societatis respectu. See our Author’s Preliminary Discourse , § 7, 8. Not that the other Kinds of Rights which impose an imperfect Obligation , do not contribute to the Good of Society. But they are not absolutely necessary to maintain it in Peace; and therefore they cannot be pursued by the Methods of Force. 4. See above, B. II. Chap. VII. § 2. II. In War all Things necessary to the End are lawful. a Victor. De...