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Essex Result 205 The Essex Result April 29, 1778 The constitution eventually adopted by the state of Massachusetts in 1780 was very much the product of local participation. A proposed draft was sent to the various counties and, in several cases, rejected. The most eloquent response came from Essex County, which, under the leadership of Theophilus Parsons, set forth both its objections and its views on the proper grounding and form of state government. While concerned specifically with the Massachusetts state constitution, the Essex Result provides an important example of the workings of local conventions more generally, and the reasoning on which they acted. The Essex Result In Convention of Delegates from the several towns of Lynn, Salem, Danvers, Wenham, Manchester, Gloucester, Ipswich, Newbury-Port, Salisbury, Methuen, Boxford, and Topsfield, holden by adjournment at Ipswich, on the twenty-ninth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight Peter Coffin Esq; in the Chair. The Constitution and form of Government framed by the Convention of this State, was read paragraph by paragraph , and after debate, the following votes were passed. 1. That the present situation of this State renders it best, that the framing of a Constitution therefor, should be postponed ’till the public affairs are in a more peaceable and settled condition. 2. That a bill of rights, clearly ascertaining and defining the rights of conscience, and that security of person and property, which every member in the State hath a right to expect from the supreme power thereof, ought to be settled and established, previous to the ratification of any constitution for the State. 3. That the executive power in any State, ought not to have any share or voice in the legislative power in framing the laws, and therefore, that the second article of the Constitution is liable to exception. 4. That any man who is chosen Governor, ought to be properly qualified in point of property—that the quali- fication therefor, mentioned in the third article of the Constitution, is not sufficient—nor is the same qualification directed to be ascertained on fixed principles, as it ought to be, on account of the fluctuation of the nominal value of money, and of property. 5. That in every free Republican Government, where the legislative power is rested in an house or houses of representatives , all the members of the State ought to be equally represented. 6. That the mode of representation proposed in the sixth article of the constitution, is not so equal a representation as can reasonably be devised. 7. That therefore the mode of representation in said sixth article is exceptionable. 8. That the representation proposed in said article is also exceptionable, as it will produce an unwieldy assembly. 9. That the mode of election of Senators pointed out in the Constitution is exceptionable. 10. That the rights of conscience, and the security of person and property each member of the State is entitled to, are not ascertained and defined in the Constitution, with a precision sufficient to limit the legislative power— and therefore, that the thirteenth article of the constitution is exceptionable. 11. That the fifteenth article is exceptionable, because the numbers that constitute a quorum in the House of Representatives and Senate, are too small. 12. That the seventeenth article of the constitution is exceptionable, because the supreme executive officer is not vested with proper authority—and because an independence between the executive and legislative body is not preserved. 13. That the nineteenth article is exceptionable, because a due independence is not kept up between the supreme legislative, judicial, and executive powers, nor between any two of them. 14. That the twentieth article is exceptionable, because 206 a new constitution the supreme executive officer hath a voice, and must be present in that Court, which alone hath authority to try impeachments. 15. That the twenty second article is exceptionable, because the supreme executive power is not preserved distinct from, and independent of, the supreme legislative power. 16. That the twenty third article is exceptionable, because the power of granting pardons is not solely vested in the supreme executive power of the State. 17. That the twenty eighth article is exceptionable, because the delegates for the Continental Congress may be elected by the House of Representatives, when all the Senators may vote against the election of those who are delegated. 18. That the thirty fourth article is exceptionable, because the rights...

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