The Constitution of England

Chapter X/1

192 u c h a p t e r x u Fundamental difference between the English Government, and the Governments just described.— In England all Executive Authority is placed out of the hands of those in whom the People trust. Usefulness of the Power of the Crown. In what manner then, has the English Constitution contrived to find a remedy for evils which, from the very nature of Men and things, seem to be irremediable? How has it found means to oblige those persons to whom the People have given up their power, to make them effectual and lasting returns of gratitude? those who enjoy an exclusive authority, to seek the advantage of all?—those who make the laws, to make only equitable ones?—It has been by subjecting them themselves to those laws, and for that purpose excluding them from all share in the executionof them. Thus, the Parliament can establish as numerous a standing army as it pleases; but immediately another Power comes forward, which takes the absolutecommand of it, whichfillsallthepostsinit,anddirectsitsmotions at its pleasure. The Parliament may lay new taxes; but immediatelyanother Power seizes upon the produce of them, and alone enjoys the advantages and glory arising from the disposal of it. The Parliament may even, if you please, repeal the laws on which the safety of the Subject is grounded; but it is not their own caprices and arbitrary humours, it is the caprice and passions of other Men, which they will have gratified, when they shall thus have overthrown the columns of public liberty. And the English Constitution has not only excluded from any share in the Execution of the laws, those in whom the People trust for the enacting chapter x 193 of them, but it has also taken from them what would have had the same pernicious influence on their deliberations—the hope of everinvadingthat executive authority, and transfering it to themselves. This authority has been made in England one single, indivisible prerogative ; it has been made for ever the unalienable attribute of one person, marked out and ascertained beforehand by solemn laws and long established custom; and all the active forces in the State have been left at his disposal. In order to secure this prerogative still farther against all possibility of invasions from individuals, it has been heightened and strengthened by every thing that can attract and fix the attention and reverence of the people . The power of conferring, and withdrawing, places and employments has also been added to it, and ambition itself has thus been interested in its defence, and service. A share in the Legislative power has also been given to the Man to whom this prerogative has been delegated: a passive share indeed, and the only one that can, with safety to the State, be trusted to him, but by means of which he is enabled to defeat every attempt against his constitutional authority. Lastly, he is the only self-existing and permanent Power inthe State.The Generals, the Ministers of State, are so only by the continuance of hispleasure . He would even dismiss the Parliament themselves, if everhesawthem begin to entertain dangerous designs; and he needs only say one word to disperse every power in the State that may threaten his authority. Formidableprerogativesthese;butwithregardtowhichweshallbeinclined to lay aside our apprehensions, if we reflect, on the one hand, on the great privileges of the People by which they have been counterbalanced, and on the other, on the happy consequences that result from their being thus united together. From this unity, and, if I may so express myself, this total sequestration of the Executive authority, this advantageous consequence in the firstplace follows, which has been mentioned in a preceding Chapter, that the attention of thewholeNationisdirectedtooneandthesameobject.ThePeople, besides, enjoy this most essential advantage, which they would vainly endeavour to obtain under the government of many,—they can give their 194 book ii confidence, without giving power over themselves, and against themselves; they can appoint Trustees, and yet not give themselves Masters. Those Men to whom the People have delegated the power of framing the Laws, are thereby made sure to feel the whole pressure of them. They can increase the prerogatives of the executive authority, but they cannot invest themselves with it:—they have it not in their power to command its motions, they only can unbind its hands. They are made to derive their importance, nay theyareindebtedfortheir existence...