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1. On Apprehension
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293 u chapter 1 u On Apprehension 1. On the nature of apprehension. On the idea, and its comprehension and extension. Apprehension is the act of the mind by which it merely perceives a thing or simply thinks about it, neither affirming nor denying it, neither desiring nor avoiding it. The representation of a thing in the mind which enables us to perceive it, is called an idea. A fuller inquiry into the relation of an idea to the actual act of apprehension belongs to the domain not of logic but of pneumatics.1 Meanwhile what is usually taught about ideas in logic may be appropriately understood of both.2 The thing which is represented to the mind through an idea is said to be its object. 1. In the longer treatment of logic provided in his dictates, Logica, sive ars intelligendi [Logic or the Art of Understanding] (1697), Carmichael included discussion that he here consigns to pneumatology, or the science of the mind, of how ideas are formed. See also below, pp. 326 ff. In the Logica he also prefaced his logic with a historical account of the origin of philosophy. In that account, he underlined the importance of direct study of the nature of things, following the lead of great philosophers of the current age, in contrast with the scholastics. 2. The two sentences preceding were a footnote in Carmichael’s text. In his Annotations on the Art of Thinking, p. 2, he asked his students to write: “See this question more correctly addressed by Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, where he teaches that ideas of things and of corporeal modes derive their origin from sensation; of spiritual things (among them the idea of thought) from reflection on our thoughts; and more general ideas (among them the idea of being) derive their origin from both sources.” 294 logic Finally the word or complex of words, by which the idea, or the object as represented by it, is signified (as triangle, good man, etc.) is normally called a term (the reason for which we will give).3 It should be distinguished as a verbal term, since the idea itself is sometimes called a mental term; as the thing represented is also sometimes called an objective term. Ideas are classified above all (not to touch here on other differences between them) either by their comprehension, i.e., by whether they include in themselves one or several representations, or by their extension, i.e., by whether they represent one or several objects. In the former respect, an idea is either simple or complex. A simple idea is one which cannot be resolved into several different ideas; such are ideas of being, power, thought, etc. A complex idea on the other hand is one which comprehends several different ideas, into which it can be resolved; such is the idea of spirit, i.e., of a thing which has the capacity to think. In the latter respect, an idea is either singular or universal. A singular idea is one which represents directly one object alone, so that it cannot be truly attributed to more than one individual: such are the ideas of Alexander , Bucephalus, this tree, etc. I say, directly, because a singular idea can represent one thing as conflated from several or related in another way to more than one; however, it cannot be predicated of these individual things in a direct, but only in an oblique, case. See what is said below about the proposition [pp. 299–300].4 By contrast, a universal idea is one which represents several direct objects indiscriminately, so that it can be truly applied to each one of them: such are the ideas of man, horse, tree, etc. Here one must note that from singular or less universal ideas, more universal ideas are formed by means of abstraction, by which some part of the former comprehension is lost, and they become as a result more simple. By contrast, from universal, ideas become singular or less universal, by means of composition, by which they are made more complex by the addition of some idea to their comprehension. 3. See below, p. 300. 4. The two sentences beginning, “I say, directly, . . .” were a footnote in Carmichael ’s text. [44.223.42.120] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 07:18 GMT) on apprehension 295 2. On division as the resolution of the extension of a universal idea. The extension of...