The Solemn Sentence of Death: Capital Punishment in Connecticut

Chapter 7: An Unofficial Moratorium, 1961–2004

196 7 AN UNOFFICIAL MORATORIUM 1961–2004 ✴ Indeed, the only absolute and unmistakable method now of preventing repetitious murders is through capital punishment. Hartford Courant, Feb. 27, 1967 The fact that a murder is a grievous wrong does not make it right to kill the murderer. Hartford Times, April 29, 1969 Expansion of defendants’ rights and restrictions on capital punishment came as a result of rulings by the federal courts.1 The culmination occurred in the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia. The United States Supreme Court in a controversial five-to-four opinion found that the arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments concerning cruel and unusual punishment and due process of the law, respectively. The ruling effectively shut down the death penalty in every state that had it. Connecticut was one of thirtyseven states to rewrite its capital code to comply with the revised standard. Under the new law of 1973, the prosecution had to prove that a series of mitigating factors did not exist. As Joseph F. Gormley, chief state’s attorney , complained in 1974, “The chance of successful prosecution under the present law is zero.”2 In response to the federal judiciary, Connecticut’s statutes and court rulings have provided for a virtual moratorium on executions, but not an outright ban. The one interruption since Taborsky’s electrocution in 1960, so far, has been the lethal injection of Michael Ross in 2005. Unlike state courts in neighboring Massachusetts in 1980 and 1984 and New York in 1995, Connecticut ’s judiciary has not declared the death penalty itself or its administration racially biased or capricious. It remains constitutional. AN UNOFFICIAL MORATORIUM, 1961–2004 197 Before Furman v. Georgia, 1961–1971 The model for a moratorium on capital punishment was established in 1961, well before the Furman decision. In that year, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the first-degree murder convictions of Arthur Culombe and Harold Rogers because of coerced confessions. Unlike Taborsky, who preferred electrocution to life in prison, Culombe’s public defender, Alexander Goldfarb, appealed the death sentence to the high court. In February 1960, the Connecticut Supreme Court had unanimously upheld the death sentence of both men, who had contested police procedures. It concluded, “The trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly admitted the confessions in evidence.”3 In contrast to the Connecticut courts, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court argued in a six-to-three decision that the police in their zeal to arrest the “mad dog killers” violated the constitutional protections of suspects. Culombe, a thirty-seven-year-old father of two, was totally illiterate and mentally deficient , but not insane. He had spent six years in third grade and was twice a resident in an institution for the feebleminded. The Connecticut Association for Retarded Children supported the appeal to the high court.4 Culombe was particularly vulnerable to intimidation, including Taborsky’s threat to kill him if he ever confessed. Despite his protests, police had never informed him of his right to remain silent and denied him access to a lawyer during days of interrogation . In concurrence with the majority opinion, Justice William O. Douglas critically added, “If this accused were a son of a wealthy or prominent person , and demanded a lawyer, can there be any doubt that his request would have been heeded? But [the] petitioner has no social status.”5 Furthermore, authorities had delayed in presenting him to a court, and to solidify their case held him on the broad charge of a breach of peace. This exchange between defense attorney Thomas McDonough and state police captain Samuel Rome at the original trial in 1957 highlighted the disputed police tactics. Rome directed the manhunt and interrogation. McDonough: “Didn’t I tell you to leave Culombe alone and not bother him anymore?” Rome: “I don’t take my orders from you, Mr. McDonough.” McDonough: “Why did you do that?” Rome: “I was doing my duty to the people of the state of Connecticut.” Culombe also claimed that the police had kicked and beaten him. The interrogators also brought his wife and children to police headquarters in an effort to elicit a confession. In court, Albert Bill, the state’s attorney, asked 198 CHAPTER 7 the defendant to identify his typed confession, but Culombe responded that he couldn’t read. Nonetheless, the trial judge admitted the...