Spare Not the Brave: The Special Activities Group in Korea

2. War

war 13 2 War I don’t want to go to war. —President Harry S. Truman dawn comes Up like thunder Pvt. Jearl “Buck” Ballow was experiencing another monotonous Sunday morning as assistant charge of quarters in his company orderly room where, during the week, he performed his regular duty assignment as assistant company clerk. He filled the time by catching up on the endless reports and schedules and rosters that dictate every moment of a soldier’s life. As he listened to the sounds of Johnny Raye, Kay Starr, and Eddie Arnold on American Forces Radio, broadcasting from only a few blocks away, a sudden announcement shattered the boredom. It was not from China, across the bay, that the thunder came, but from across the 38th parallel. At about 4 a.m. on Sunday, 25 June 1950, seven divisions of the North Korean People’s Army crossed into the Republic of Korea. The divisions moved under concealment of the rains of the summer monsoons; surprise was complete. Reports soon poured in to the American advisors in Seoul, and it quickly became apparent that these were not isolated incidents. The attacks stretched from the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast across the Korean Peninsula to the Sea of Japan. Advisors such as Capt. Joe Darrigo, Maj. Gerald Larson, and Maj. George Kessler suddenly found themselves in the middle of a war. By midmorning, the advisors had also learned of two amphibious landings by guerillas south of the parallel, along the east coast.1 Reports that several ROK regiments quickly had been overwhelmed reached the U.S. Army attaché, Lt. Col. Robert E. Edwards, at the embassy 13 14 Spare Not the Brave North Korea South Korea Pusan Perim eter Ongjin Peninsula Chinju Taejo n Suncho n Pusan Kunsan Waeg wan Taeg u Po hang d o ng Osan Suwo n Incho n Chuncho n Kaeso ng Kang nung Wo nju Tanyang Chung ju Chum unjin- up Seoul Pyo ng yang Wo nsan Sokdae-do C h eju-do 38th Parallel Yo su war 15 in Seoul. Some regiments fought desperately but eventually gave way before the onslaught. Often outflanked and outnumbered, the ROK Army had no choice except to withdraw. The news Edwards brought from his personal visit to the front, north of the capital, left no doubt in the mind of U.S. ambassador John Muccio that the situation was dire. At 10:00 a.m. Muccio notified Secretary of State Acheson that “North Korean forces invaded ROK 4 a.m.”2 In hindsight, there were indications that the North Koreans intended to launch an attack against the south. The North Korean government had long declared its intention to reunite the two Koreas. The National Security Council had warned President Truman in March 1949 that the Soviets intended to dominate Korea. Such domination would have threatened United States interests in the region. Clearly staking out his position, the president informed Congress that summer that the United States “will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this critical time.” In October 1949 North Korea notified UN secretary-general Trygve Lie that it reserved the right to reunite the two Koreas by force. As early as 30 December 1949, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, FEC G-2 (Intelligence Section), reported indications of a possible North Korean attack in March or April of 1950, but he concluded that “such an act is unlikely.” The Joint Weekly Intelligence report from FEC dated 10 March 1950 included the following statements: “Report received that People’s Army . . . will invade South Korea in June, 1950. . . . We don’t believe this statement.” That spring, Ambassador Muccio informed Congress that he believed that “the threat of north Korean aggression seems, temporarily at least, to have been successfully contained.” In contrast, on 7 June—only eighteen days prior to the invasion—Radio Pyongyang broadcast that North Korea intended to reunify the peninsula by 15 August. A 19 June 1950 report issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—six days before the North Korean invasion—warned that “trained and equipped units . . . are being deployed southward in the area of the 38th Parallel” and that “tanks and heavy artillery have also been moved close to the Parallel in recent months.” Although the report examined the capability of North Korea to conduct military operations in the south, the report did not conclude that an attack...