Spare Not the Brave: The Special Activities Group in Korea

9. Chang-to

168 Spare Not the Brave 9 Chang-to We were determined to hold Chang-to at all costs. —John Connor, Let Slip the Dogs of War the chess Match As Maj. Gen. Ho San Pang’s North Korean V Corps was attempting to batter its way toward Wonju along Highway 29, Gen. Choe Hyon was infiltrating his II Corps through the mountains east of Highway 29. Pang sent two of his divisions in a wide easterly sweep in the gap between the X Corps and the scattered ROK divisions. However, he oriented his Tenth Division only slightly to the east of Highway 29. In so doing, the division first encountered units from the U.S. 2nd Division and then hit the ROK Seventh Division that was moving into positions south of Wonju. Attempting to avoid a major engagement, the Tenth Division commander tried to slip east and south away from the ROKs, but he ran into the U.S. 7th Division, which was moving into positions between Andong and Wonju. In the ensuing fight, the North Koreans left five hundred dead on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the ROK III Corps commander to Almond’s right was assembling his scattered divisions and was able to reduce the gap on the X Corps right to fifteen miles. By then, though, portions of three North Korean divisions were south of what had been the main UN defenses and were poised to create havoc in the X Corps rear.1 Under pressure from advancing Chinese forces, Walker had mapped several potential lines of defense across the Korean Peninsula. To defend along successive lines as authorized by the Joint Chiefs, Ridgway used Walker’s plans with some modifications as a basis for withdrawal. Line B had been shattered 168 chaNg-to 169 by the attacks on New Year’s Eve. Line C, along the south bank of the Han River, had been abandoned when Seoul was evacuated. Now, Line D, which ran from Pyongtaek in the west, south of Yoju, to Wonju in the center and on to the Sea of Japan, was in jeopardy.2 Ridgway saw his first task as “restoring the fighting spirit of the forces under my command.” This meant restoring the soldiers’ confidence in their commanders and their decisions. With lightning-like movements, he visited every corps and division headquarters and established a temporary headquarters at I Corps. He sought out the soldiers and worked to build their morale. Outwardly optimistic, on 6 January the Eighth Army commander nevertheless wrote MacArthur about the possibility of evacuating the peninsula. The World War II hero earlier had directed the FEC staff to develop plans to evacuate UN forces from Korea. He would not evacuate, however, without authorization from Washington. Such a decision, he cabled the Joint Chiefs, is “of highest national and international importance, far above the competence of a Theater Commander.” In the nation’s capital, secretary of defense George C. Marshall was very concerned. “We were at our lowest point,” he later remarked. The Joint Chiefs left the decision of whether to evacuate in MacArthur’s hands.3 Osan Line B Highway 29 Yoju W onju Pagyoul C hungju Pyongtaek Kum chon Sanyang Sangju Vechon Andong C hechon Vongw ol C hungdo-ri Tanyang N aegon-ni Yongju Pohangdong Angang-ni Palsong-ni H w anggang-ni Tuin-dong Sokpyong-ni C hangto Kalpong-ni H ongchon C hipyong-ni C hongpung Taejon 170 Spare Not the Brave Hanes knew nothing of these debates. Even had he known, they were of no immediate importance to the soldiers of SAG. What was important, if not critical, was that North Korean divisions were moving south and guerrillas were operating in SAG’s area. As mentioned previously, Communist partisans who remained on Cheju-do after the war attempted to establish control of the island in April 1948 but were unsuccessful. Soon, though, South Korean and American intelligence agencies determined that guerrillas were present in every province of the south. The CIA identified Tanyang, north of Chang-to, as a center of guerrilla activity. North Korean guerrillas had been present in the Andong region since August 1949, when the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland attempted to unite the two Koreas by force. In October three hundred guerrillas had raided supply, food, and ammunition sites in Chinju, killing ten local police and soldiers in the process. Pak Hon-yong, leader of...