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The Maumee River Campaign, 1812–1813 Larry L. Nelson During the opening months of the War of 1812, the most important factor shaping the strategic environment within the Detroit theater was British naval control of Lake Erie. Control of Lake Erie permitted the British to move men and supplies easily from the Niagara theater to Detroit, Michilimackinac, and, indeed, throughout most of Upper Canada at will. Further, British control necessarily denied access and use of the lake to the Americans. There was simply no easy way for the United States to move men or supplies to Detroit or its environs without a long and arduous journey either directly through Ohio’s Great Black Swamp, a nearly impenetrable morass extending some 40 miles north and south and 140 miles east and west laying along the southern border of the Maumee Valley, or by submitting to an equally tedious trek that circumvented the swamp to the south and west to Fort Wayne, then traveled down the Maumee River, and finally ended in a march of some 50 miles from the foot of the Maumee rapids in present-day Maumee to Detroit.1 If Lake Erie was the lock, Maumee Bay was one of the most important doors secured by the British Navy, for flowing into it from the west lay the Maumee River, at the time one of the most strategically important rivers in northern Ohio. The Maumee or its tributaries provided access into Ohio, Michigan, and the interior of Indiana. Those moving westward on the river found the Maumee rapids—a fourteen-mile-long series of shallow rapids extending from present-day Grand Rapids, Ohio, to present-day Maumee and Perrysburg (on the river’s left and right bank, respectively) in which the river drops fifty-five feet—the last obstacle to a generally unimpeded journey to the Auglaize River at Defiance and, with it, access to southern Ohio. Or, if so inclined, travelers could continue all the way to the river’s headwaters at – 11 – 12 military operations Fort Wayne. From there, after a short portage to the Wabash River, journeyers could then ride that stream to the Ohio River and then to the Mississippi River and, from there, to the Gulf of Mexico. The key to controlling the Maumee was command of the foot of the rapids where lay a strategic intersection of land and water routes. By directing events at the rapids, both belligerents could protect or interdict supplies, arms, materials, and troops destined either for Ohio or Sandwich (present-day Windsor, Ontario) and also guarantee access and use of the traditional land routes of invasion leading both to the United States or Canada. Even before the declaration of war, American officials had decided to use the Maumee Valley as the primary corridor through which to deliver men, materials, and provisions to Detroit.2 Secretary of War William Eustis named the governor of the Michigan Territory, William Hull, a brigadier general in the U.S. army in the spring of 1812. Eustis ordered Hull to lead a force of 2,000 Ohio militia and U.S. regulars to Detroit and, should circumstances warrant, then carry the war to Canada. Mustering in Urbana, Ohio, in early June, Hull’s army marched northward, traversing the Great Black Swamp and arriving at the foot of the Maumee rapids on 29 June, where it lingered for two days while Hull rested and consolidated his force. Renewing the march on 1 July, the next day Hull learned of the 18 June declaration of war. Continuing the advance, Hull ordered a detachment of Ohio militia commanded by Captain Henry Brush to man a small blockhouse and stockade built originally during the 1790s Wayne campaigns at Frenchtown (present-day Monroe, Michigan) on the River Raisin. The remaining Americans then pushed ahead to Detroit, reaching the city on 5 July and crossing into Canada on 11 July. But Hull’s offensive lost momentum long before it could threaten Fort Amherstburg, the British stronghold in Malden (also called Fort Malden). Eventually, the American army reversed its course and retreated back to Detroit. On 16 August, when faced with an enterprising and intrepid counteroffensive mounted by the commander of British military forces in Upper Canada, Isaac Brock, Hull surrendered his army, his post at Detroit, and the remainder of the Michigan Territory to the British.3 The articles of capitulation demanded that all American troops at Detroit surrender themselves and their arms to the British. The surrender also...

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