Greek-American Relations from Monroe to Truman

3. The Cause of Freedom and Humanity

42 greek-american relations from monroe to truman 3 The Cause of Freedom and Humanity I go to assist in the political redemption of Greece; to endeavour to infuse into her councils the wise, moderate and progressive nature of our own happy institutions ;—and to guard her from anarchy on one hand, and from the subtle and corrupting influences of neighboring aristocracies on the other. It is my determination never to leave the soil of Greece until her liberties are achieved;—or, at least, whilst one Greek banner remains unfurled. —Estwick Evans, New Hampshire Gazette, April 12, 1825 We do not, fellow citizens, address ourselves to your fancy, but to your heart.— We do not endeavor to revive your classic recollections, nor awaken your fruitless chivalry. . . . We do not invoke you, by the names of ancient philosophers, or of modern martyrs—by the past glories of Marathon and Salamis, or to the recent horrors of Scio and Messolonghi; but we appeal to you as Americans, as Christians, as men—as husbands and fathers, as sons and brothers. We ask you to succour and save from famine the women and children of Greece. . . . Can your sending bread to the famishing children of Greece involve your government ? Will it not relieve, extensively relieve them? And we ask our esteemed fellow citizens, who shrink from the slightest connection with anything of war, is there war in this? —United States Gazette, December 22, 1826 In 1824, while public enthusiasm over the Greek Revolution was at its height, one of the last surviving heroes of the American Revolution returned to the United States. The Marquis de Lafayette’s visit in 1824–25 stirred the mystic chords of 1776. Americans welcomed him with balls and banquets and eulogized him in speeches, poems, and songs. But Lafayette did not come to the United States simply to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the American independence. 42 the cause of freedom and humanity 43 With the rise of the Holy Alliance in Europe and his own failure to defeat conservative forces at home, Lafayette hoped that his visit to the United States could rekindle the spirit of republicanism.1 Lafayette would use the forum of his trip to champion the struggle for freedom abroad in places like Greece. In doing so he hoped to force Americans to reexamine the meaning of the “American mission.” In the winter of 1823–24, speakers like Edward Everett and Daniel Webster had insisted on a more direct U.S. intervention in support of liberty abroad. More conservative opponents like Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, however, believed that America could best serve the cause of liberty as a passive example for other nations to follow. With the perceived threat of European intervention in Latin America, Washington outlined a policy of separate spheres. The Monroe Doctrine, while warning against European interference in the hemisphere, also cautioned against American involvement in European affairs. While Lafayette’s visit did not appreciably alter that policy of neutrality, the warm reception he received throughout the country, Sylvia Neely argues, reflected a longing to do more.2 Lafayette’s much-publicized tour helped keep the Greek cause alive in the national consciousness. On his return home in 1825, he remarked that the American people remained “very favorably inclined toward the Greeks.” His optimism was buoyed by the appointment of William C. Sommerville, who accompanied Lafayette back to France in September 1825 as the first U.S. agent to Greece. Adams, who opposed the sending of an agent while he was secretary of state in 1824, now consented as president. With his election secure and the threat of European interference having subsided, Adams became more amenable to public opinion. Indeed, as Henry Clay wrote Sommerville, “the very deep interest” Americans felt in the Greek cause induced this appointment. As the new secretary of state, Clay may have also influenced the decision. While Speaker of the House in 1824, Clay had supported Daniel Webster’s resolution to send an American representative to Greece, and Sommerville’s mission was very similar to the one proposed by Webster: he was to gather information on the progress of the war and Greece’s ability to sustain an independent government; aid American commerce; and, if asked, afford Greek leaders with advice, information, and “friendly” offices. But Clay made it quite clear that the sending of an agent did not signal the United States’s departure from its previous policy of strict neutrality. Sommerville, however, fell...