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Chapter 2. The New Market Road
- The Kent State University Press
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“be ready to meet the enemy” For Benjamin Butler’s infantry, the rumors and reports of lee’s movement the previous night warned of more combat Friday morning. at daylight, federal units prepared for a fight. But when the dawn passed and nothing happened, relief filtered through the ranks and “many a joke cracked over the last needless scare.”1 However, about an hour after sunrise, the sounds of battle drifted from Johnson’s Farm and floated into the infantry camps south of the new Market Road. The thud of far-away cannon and the crackle of rifles offered little novelty to veteran ears. But “between 6 and 7 o’clock we heard heavy firing on our extreme right,” recalled one soldier,2 and it became clear that the distant thunder signaled more than mere skirmishing. any uncertainty ended when the long roll sounded, and the infantrymen shouldered their weapons.3 alfred terry’s division from the tenth Corps took position at the new Market Road. in the Union army, each corps bore its own distinctive badge, a system initiated by general Joseph Hooker in 1863. The tenth Corps badge featured a four-bastioned fort, a fitting symbol, as terry’s men had spent the last few days plunging spades into the captured Confederate works and refacing them west. The remodeled parapet stretched north from Fort Harrison and covered Butler’s right flank. not everyone was happy with the new defense line, though. in particular , Butler’s acting chief engineer, Peter Michie, had misgivings. He wrote that the “portion occupied by the tenth army Corps is very weak and not well laid out. it is simply the old rebel line reversed. i have urged a new line, with appropriate works, to protect our right flank and make it secure, but an unwillingness has been manifested to have this carried out for the present.”4 The underlying problem was obvious. The terminus of the works at the new Market Road bent back for only a short stretch. The Union flank there had no anchor. it was completely “in the air.” and the Confederates, after their victory at Johnson’s Farm on Friday morning, headed straight for this vulnerable spot. 49 Chapter 2 The new Market Road • 50 richmond must fall Though the fortifications may have been subpar, the Union commanders assigned to this sector were not. The tenth Corps chief, Major general david Birney, was an able combat leader. Born in alabama in 1825 to the son of an antislavery leader, he had practiced law in Philadelphia before the war and, during the conflict, had participated in numerous campaigns. despite a tendency to clash with superiors, his solid leadership helped to ensure a deserved rise through the command ranks.5 He proved to be a tough fighter and excellent division commander in Winfield Hancock’s Second Corps during the overland campaign. However, he crossed Meade by siding against him in intra-army squabbling over events at gettysburg.6 nevertheless, the army “had few officers who could command 10,000 men as well as he,” in the view of Colonel Theodore lyman.7 after joining the army of the James, Birney achieved mixed results while leading the tenth Corps at deep Bottom in august and in the late September fighting. now, on this bright clear Friday, Birney held the point of danger against an attack that threatened the safety of Butler’s entire position. Unfortunately, Birney was grievously ill, suffering from a “malarious fever” that had plagued him for some time. nevertheless, ignoring his physician’s advice to remain in his tent, “he was up and in his saddle” when the alarm sounded that morning.8 at army headquarters, Benjamin Butler also prepared for battle. With grant in Washington, Butler enjoyed unfettered control over the decisions on the field. But the pudgy lawyer was no steely pugilist. Few occasions found him at the front, under fire, barking out orders. indeed, he generally left battlefield decisions to his subordinates. However, he possessed a decent tactical sense and, as news from the Johnson Farm arrived, he clearly understood the threat to his open right flank. Throughout the morning, he peppered david Birney with urgent directives. at 8:20 a.m., Birney received a note requesting that he “be ready to send assistance to Kautz when he needs it.” at 8:55 a.m., Butler admonished, “let your right fall back and be ready to meet the enemy, who are advancing.” about ten minutes later...