ch17
“withdraw rather than take the responsibility of disaster” Colonel Charles Weygant, of the 124th new York, struggled to the rear with his third wound of the war. leaving his command near the Plank Road, he staggered to a small house beyond the park of wagons and ambulances.1 after having his wound examined by a surgeon, he stepped out into the dusk and headed for a row of ambulances. Weak from loss of blood, he crawled into a wagon and lay down. outside, the rain increased noticeably as the sound of gunfire faded. Raising himself, he gazed forward toward the horse team hitched to his wagon. His daze ended abruptly when several enemy artillery shells thundered past, one tearing a horse’s head off. “i became convinced that i had taken the wrong conveyance and forthwith crawled out at the rear end,” he wrote later.2 in the momentary glare, Weygant spied his aide leading his horse away from the front line. He hobbled to his mount, climbed into the stirrups, and headed for what he “supposed” to be the Union rear.3 at dusk, general Hancock weighed his options. He considered remaining at the Burgess Farm but despaired, as he later reported, that “unless the Fifth Corps moved up and connected with me, i could not answer for the result.”4 With the offensive over, his position served little purpose. The prospect of remaining isolated for the night south of Hatcher’s Run could not have been inviting. However, without specific orders to withdraw, he sought more guidance from his superiors. at 5 p.m., he sent Major H. H. Bingham to find general Crawford and provide a status report. Bingham steered his horse along a cart path east but soon stumbled into a thicket of enemy troops. Reversing his course, he chose the dabney Mill Road instead. after several hundred yards on this route, he jogged left toward the Crow house. in a mile or so, he abruptly encountered two hundred members of a north Carolina regiment. The tar Heels, fresh from the repulse at the Burgess cornfield were making their way back toward Hatcher’s Run, albeit in a roundabout way. Upon surrendering to the Carolinians, Bingham told the officer in charge that he did so “because i considered resistance as useless, but that i was of the opinion 275 Chapter 17 Retreat • 276 richmond must fall he was my prisoner instead of my being his.” The Carolinians had captured three ambulances, twenty or so horses, and about twenty prisoners. Bingham remained with his captors into the early evening. But around 8 p.m., he managed to convince his guard that the Carolinians had drifted into the Union lines. The frightened rebels plunged into the bushes, and Bingham escaped into the darkness.5 around five o’clock, shortly after Bingham set out on his fruitless mission, a messenger arrived at Hancock’s field headquarters bearing some obsolete news from Meade’s chief of staff, andrew Humphreys. Throughout the afternoon, federal signal stations had observed Confederate troops streaming west from Petersburg and southwest along the Boydton Plank Road. From the high tower at the Church Road station, lookouts spotted six rebel regiments headed for Hancock at 2:30 p.m.6 Humphreys’s note warned Hancock, “Signal officers report the movement of the enemy’s troops down the Boydton plank road. no doubt they are concentrating toward you.” Though the warning was late, the note also directed the Second Corps chief to hold his position until morning and coordinate his actions with Crawford, whose command still remained along Hatcher’s Run. Humphreys cautioned that the dabney Mill Road, Hancock’s lifeline, was “still infested by small parties of the enemy’s cavalry or guerillas,” a fact that had become steadily apparent all afternoon as couriers and staff officers sought to navigate the wilderness.7 Hancock was in a bind. The Confederates nearly encircled the “bull pen” that held his troops. The safety of the Union entrenchments were six miles to the east over cramped roads. His tired units had little ammunition. The men had been marching and fighting most of the day and, as a result, were in considerable disorder .8 The artillery batteries were worse off. one had no shells left, another had very little, and the third had lost too many officers and men to operate its pieces effectively. gregg’s cavalry also lacked cartridges and remained disorganized from the late afternoon fight.9 The frail...
OR
Buy This Book in Print