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Marse Robert and the Fevers: A Note on the General as Strategist and on Medical Ideas as a Factor in Civil War Decision Making
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marse robert and the fevers 255 Marse robert and the Fevers a Note on the General as strategist and on Medical ideas as a Factor in Civil war Decision Making richard M. McMurry In 1969, Thomas lawrence Connelly launched an effort to reevaluate robert e. lee, his record as a field commander, and his role as a Confederate strategist. His objective was to depict lee “as he actually was.”over the past two decades Connelly—sometimes joined byotherhistorians—haspursuedwhat he hascalled “the real lee,” expanding his study to include not only the general himself but also an investigation of his image in american society and letters.1 so far as historians of the Civil War are concerned, the most important part of Connelly’s reexamination of lee has been that which focused on the general’s role as a Confederate military strategist. In the first year of the war, lee successively commanded the Virginia state army, Confederate troops in 255 E Civil War History, Vol. XXXV no. 3 © 1989 by The Kent state University Press 1.Connelly,“roberte. lee and theWesternConfederacy:aCriticism of lee’s strategicability,” Civil war history 15 (June 1969): 116–32;“The Image and the General: robert e. lee in american Historiography,” ibid. Civil war history 19 (March 1973): 50–64; The Marble Man: robert E. lee and his image in american society (newYork:Knopf, 1977);(with archer Jones), The Politics of Command: Factions and ideas in Confederate strategy (baton rouge:louisiana state Univ. Press, 31–48;and (with barbara l. bellows), God and General longstreet: The lost Cause and the southern Mind (baton rouge: louisiana state Univ. Press, 1982), 73–106. For some general critiques of Connelly’s thesis about lee (neitherof which mentions the general’s idea that is the subject of this paper) seealbert Castel, “The Historian and the General: Thomas l. Connelly versus robert e. lee,” Civil war history 16 (March 1970): 50–63; and richard M. McMurry, Two Great rebel armies: an Essay in Confederate Military history (Chapel Hill: Univ. of north Carolina Press, 1989), 140–55. 256 richard m. mcmurry western Virginia, and rebel forces along the south atlantic Coast before he was appointed militaryadvisertoConfederate President Jefferson davis. Forthe last three years of the conflict lee led the principal rebel army in the eastern theaterof thewar.Connellybelieves that, from 1862 to 1865,whilecommanding one southern field army, lee also acted as an adviser to davis. The president frequently consulted lee about general strategy and about particular military matters that arose in different parts of the Confederacy. lee’s advice, Connelly asserts, was consistent. He always urged the government to take troops from other areas and send them to reinforce his own army in Virginia so that it could take the offensive against the Union army of the Potomac. The old dominion, lee maintained, was the main seat of war and the place where the Federals would make their greatest effort. on those rare occasions when lee rose above a narrow focus on his native state to discuss possible operations for the armies stationed in areas outside Virginia, he gave impractical, if not foolish, advice because hewas ignorant of regions beyond the borders of the old dominion. lee, for example, asserted on several occasions that what he sometimes called “the season”—hot, muggy summer weather with its attendant diseases—would make it impossible for northern troops, or white men in general, to carry on military operations in the deep south during the June-september period. because he held this belief, lee was able to argue that it was not necessary to send reinforcements from his army to the deep south in the spring or summer because theYankeeswould soon be forced bynature herself to suspend military operations there. even worse, lee maintained, there was a real likelihood that any Confederate reinforcements sent from the Upper south to those regions would themselves fall victim to the unhealthful summer climate of the lower Mississippi Valley or the southern coast. lee’s views about the deleterious deep south summer climate emerged most conspicuously in the spring 1863 debate over strategy. a large Federal army was beseigingVicksburg, Mississippi, and theConfederate government had todecide what action to take to try to lift the siege and save its communication with the Trans-Mississippistates.Threeplansweresuggested.Twocalled forsending large numbers of troops from lee’s army to the West. Under one of these proposals they would go to Mississippi to take part in direct operations against the Union army at Vicksburg...