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8 Mutual Dependence in 864 In 864 Britain’s strict neutrality was further challenged. Confederates operating out of Canada captured Federal ships on Lake Erie and raided the hamlet of St. Albans in Vermont. A further threat to neutrality also occurred when Congress, without the administration’s support, gave notice that it was going to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty of 854, which had expanded commerce on both sides of the border and allowed New Englanders to fish in Canadian inshore waters. The notice was given more to spite Britain’s alleged breaches of neutrality rather than for sound economic reasons. In all of these matters, Britain and the United States continued to cooperate. Russell and Seward remained patient and pacific. Russell worked for the unification of the Canadian colonies partly as a shield against U.S. revenge but primarily to bring to fruition his goal of responsible self-government under a confederation plan he set in motion in the late 830s. Confederate acts of violence and robbery launched from Canada only made him impatient for a dominion of Canada. Like Russell, other British leaders were as afraid of Union reactions as they were dubious that the Canadians would ever quit their provincial differences and establish statehood without a substantial British investment. But the cooperation from the Americans helped the Canadians see, especially with the notice to terminate reciprocity that meant the return to fisheries problems, that they had better centralize the political and economic structures for historic purposes rather than for defense alone. Thus, from 864 to 867, Canadian leaders moved toward union just as the American Union was being resurrected. The traditional interpretation is that Canada was a hostage to British-American relations during the Civil War and moved toward confederation in the war’s last years in order to better face Union wrath. Fearful of a revengeful Union land grab, the British, it is said, moved Canada to unite against the expected Federal onslaught by forming a central government over Canada and the Maritimes, forming a trained militia to defend the frontier, and promising little else. The evidence 7 72 caution and cooperation shows that the only commotion along the frontier was by desperate Confederates trying to sway the British against the North. Their antics backfired and produced triangular cooperation. Thus a more subtle interpretation is needed. First of all, the real dispute was between the Canadians and the British. Russell ’s generation knew since the 830s that Canadian politicians were unreliable because of their provincialism. Nor were Canada’s leaders eager to take advantage of the Union’s plight when the Civil War broke out. If anything, they knew that the war was an economic boon. Only some conservatives supported the South. Moreover, Lincoln ignored the possibilities of cultivating Canadian public opinion in order to concentrate on the British people and British newspapers.¹ There was thus little reason for Britain to modernize fortifications at Montreal and Quebec because Parliament opposed military expenditures for Canadian defense, and there was never a majority in the United States interested in annexation. Moreover, antebellum contingencies continued to play a decisive role. BritishCanadian relations were precarious since the 830s when Russell pressed for responsible self-government, economic growth, and self-defense. Fear of losing military and financial support caused Canadian leaders to procrastinate from the fall of 858 through June 864. At that point, the Duke of Newcastle, the colonial secretary, favored a legislative union of the Maritime Provinces rather than a larger union of the Maritimes with Upper and Lower Canada. As the Civil War began, Newcastle waited for the Maritimes to assume leadership of a federation of all of the provinces. The Maritimes were not only jealous of each other but also extremely put out by the greater sway of the two Canadas on the mainland in a larger confederation. Thus Newcastle’s plan was exactly wrong for the confederation that he wanted. He was saddled with finding a new governor-general who blended civil and military into an advocacy for confederation, and he asked three candidates without success.² Newcastle and his colleagues wanted to bring to fruition three decades of frustration about Canadian obstinacy and petty internal rivalries. Their long-range mission to make manifest a Canadian confederation coincided with Britain’s military withdrawal that had begun in the 840s. Withdrawal began with Britain’s recognition of its inability to safeguard Canada, the French rivalry, and the Oregon compromise at the 49th parallel, all...

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