-
2. Chasms, Bridges, and the Summer of Violence
- The Kent State University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
2 Chasms, Bridges, and the Summer of Violence The Eisenhower government was determined to prevent Singapore from falling under communist control. Developments on the island, however, distressed Washington. It appeared that communists were capitalizing on local sociopolitical restiveness stirred by Britain’s retreat from empire to subvert Singapore. Not wanting to cross the British, U.S. officials initially hesitated to interfere in the colony’s affairs. Their mind-sets changed when groups advocating more revolutionary paths to independence broke the hold that moderate factions, which had championed the evolutionary route, had on Singapore’s domestic politics. Violent riots that erupted in May 1955 also confirmed the officials’ worst fears about the intentions of local procommunist agents. To American observers, the decolonization of the strategic island seemed to have gone awry. Believing American strategic interests were under threat, U.S. diplomats urged Washington to deepen its involvement in Singapore’s affairs. Their pleas would be answered. As developments on the island worsened, American policymakers would sanction unilateral U.S. intervention to protect U.S. interests in Singapore. U.S. Interests in Malaya and Singapore Eisenhower was cognizant of the troubles in Malaya when he assumed the presidency . Twice—in his inaugural address and in his first State of the Union speech— he commended the British for dealing decisively with the communist-inspired insurrection in Malaya.1 The newly elected president’s public declarations were not mere rhetoric. Concerns about Malaya and Singapore were also aired in the NSC, over which Eisenhower presided. Contrary to traditional perceptions that the president was a ductile and nominal figurehead, numerous studies have demonstrated he was intimately involved in policymaking.2 Under Eisenhower, the NSC also had a more formalized structure. The NSC Planning Board, chaired 13 14 safe for decolonization by the special assistant for national security affairs, drafted policy papers. It also collated and acted to reconcile positions advanced by various departments and agencies before channeling them to the council for debate and decision. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), chaired by the undersecretary of state, followed up on the council’s policy decisions, devised operational plans, monitored their execution, and provided feedback on the plans’ efficacy. Alongside these bureaucratic bodies, the president also consulted with his chief foreign policy adviser , Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on security matters.3 Eisenhower and his staff were undoubtedly concerned about the security of American interests in Singapore and what losing the strategic island might mean for U.S. containment policy in Asia. Given that “sea traffic must pass through the Straits of Malacca,” U.S. policymakers noted the island’s importance as a key strategic chokepoint commanding the communication routes linking the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Apart from Bangkok, it was also one of the most important centers for “[air] traffic west of the Pacific area.” If Singapore fell under communist control, American military operations would be adversely affected. Denied access to the island’s naval, airport, and refueling facilities, U.S. naval forces would be hampered in their capacity to mass in the Pacific or the Mediterranean. They might also have to run a communist gauntlet if they had to transit the Malacca Strait en route to the Pacific or the Mediterranean. In such scenarios, Washington might not prevail against its communist adversaries during a global conflict.4 In time, too, if Singapore ’s fall triggered a domino effect and set in motion the collapse of neighboring Malaya, the loss of the resource-rich territory to communism would enhance the communist powers’ warmaking potential. The outcome might also undermine U.S. containment efforts in Europe and Northeast Asia. If Britain was deprived of the dollar earnings from Malaya’s commodity exports and if Japan was denied access to Malaya’s market and resources, their recovery from economic recession and their ability to back Washington’s containment policy might be seriously jeopardized.5 The credibility of American power was also at stake. If Washington failed to stop communist expansion into Southeast Asia, adversaries and allies as well as the nonaligned might infer that it was disinterested or weak. Local communists, operating in states that were adjacent to one that had just been captured by their comrades, might be emboldened to launch subversive operations of their own against their respective governments. Like a row of dominoes toppling over, states across Southeast Asia could swiftly fall to communism if any one of them was subverted. Likewise, if the communist advance into Southeast Asia appeared unstoppable , wavering...