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Notes Introduction 1. Roosevelt’s “moral embargo” originated in a 5 Aug. 1936 State Department meeting. See Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: MacMillan, 1948), 1:477– 78; F. Jay Taylor, “Great Debate,” in The United States and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (New York: Bookman, 1956). For the debate on military intervention following the German invasion of Poland in Sept. 1939, see Michael W. Miles, The Odyssey of the American Right (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980), 50. 2. In July 1936 the Loyalists had some twenty-two Douglas transports, including four modern DC-2s. Engines and mechanical parts were more critical than airframes, for 1930s engines wore out quickly, sometimes failing in under 100 hours of flight and requiring an overhaul after about 250 hours. Barcelona-based Hispano-Suiza provided engines for French aircraft, such as the Loyalists’ Nieuport 52s and Breguet XIXs; but even before the dislocations of July 1936, they could never build enough, so they had subcontracted production to what became Curtiss-Wright in Buffalo, NY. Wright’s ubiquitous Cyclone-9 aircooled rotary engine powered, among other aircraft, the Tupolev SB-2 twin-engine bomber and Polikarpov I-15 fighter (German pilots called the I-15 a Curtiss), of which ten SB-2s and twenty-five I-15s arrived in the Loyalist zone from the USSR as early as mid-Oct. 1936. While the potent I-16 single-wing fighter came with a Shevetsov ASh-62 engine, this was a modified Cyclone, with which it would have been interchangeable had Curtiss-Wright shipped engines to Spain. Howson (app. 3) documents the arrival of fifty-one Tupolevs and 400 Polikarpovs by boat during the conflict, although the total that the Soviets delivered— whether by land from France or by other flagged vessels—was three times higher. Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). Reina Pennington gives a figure of 1,500, and Tom Alison and Von Hardesty give 1,400 flown by 700 Russian pilots, in Robin Higham, John T. Greenwood, and Von Hardesty, eds., Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 44, 92–93. A measure of the importance of engines is that after Apr. 1937, the USSR shipped at least 380 replacement engines, which is the number in Howson (Arms for Spain), so the total number of engines could well have been three times that. 3. For a discussion of Soviet exchange rate manipulation, see Howson, Arms for Spain. After Aug. 1937 the Soviets abandoned shipments from the Black Sea, which had to run a gauntlet of Italian submarines off Sicily. Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), xi–xii, 158, 389. 228 4. Diary entry for 12 May 1938, Harold L. Ickes, The Inside Struggle, 1936–1939, vol. 2, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954), 390; Allen Guttmann, The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War (Glencoe, NY: Free Press, 1962), 119; Leo V. Kanawada Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Diplomacy and American Catholics, Italians, and Jews (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1982), 65; for data, see chap. 3 below. 5. For examples of “Catholic hierarchy,” see David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 399; and for “fascist crackpots,” see Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval, 1935–1936 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), 82. A term of 1930s leftists, “lunatic fringe” denoted right-wing extremists. Exemplifying the conflation of rightists with “pathological” “crackpots” is Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), esp. intro.; Peter N. Carroll and James D. Fernandez, eds., Facing Fascism: New York and the Spanish Civil War (New York: New York Univ. Press, 2007). 6. America’s leading authority on the Spanish Civil War, Stanley G. Payne concludes that “Franco was never a ‘core Fascist’ or a genuine Falangist.” Payne, Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977 (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 477. He notes that following the civil war, there was “a growing expression of the fascist style in politics and an increasing political ‘vertigo of fascism,’ even though [Franco’s] regime was eclectic in its personnel and origins, and culturally and spiritually depended as much or more on Catholicism.” Payne, Franco and...

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