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5. Veracruz and the End of Huerta, April-July 1914
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65 In early 1914, frustrated by Huerta’s lingering hold on power, President Woodrow Wilson began considering more forceful ways to oust the dictator. His “watchful waiting” policy, which combined diplomatic pressure on Huerta with sometimes discreet, sometimes open, support for Huerta’s opponents, was not working fast enough to satisfy the increasingly impatient president. Consequently, Wilson began to consider more direct methods of involvement in Mexican affairs, including military intervention. April 1914 saw Wilson’s patience come to an end. Taking advantage of a minor incident (described at length in chapter 4), in which Mexican soldiers briefly arrested several American sailors at the port of Tampico, Wilson endorsed a demand by the U.S. admiral there, Henry Mayo, that the Mexican government fire a ceremonial salute honoring the U.S. flag. When Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta refused, Wilson asked Congress for permission to use force against Huerta’s regime. As Congress debated Wilson’s request, the White House received reports that the Ypiranga, a German ship loaded with arms for Huerta, was about to dock at Veracruz. This report gave Wilson the excuse he needed to act. He ordered U.S. warships to seize the city’s customs house and the Ypiranga’s cargo. President Wilson’s reaction seemed disproportionate to the provocation. He had previously refused to react with force to more serious transgressions against U.S. interests and would do so again—most notably after the killing of U.S. citizens by Mexican arms fire across the border. If Wilson’s real goal of ridding Mexico of Huerta is taken into account, however, his reaction makes more sense; the level of forced ordered by Wilson was consistent with his larger aim—specifically, ousting 5 Veracruz and the End of Huerta, April–July 1914 66 Leading them to the Promised Land the Mexican dictator. The demand for a salute provided Wilson with an occasion to win support in Congress and among the public, but it remained only an excuse, quickly forgotten once fighting actually began. Incidental factors also played a part in Wilson’s decision, notably his shortened temper during that period resulting from the strain of his wife’s lingering illness. He snapped at reporters for spreading “rumors” about his family and lost his temper more easily than usual. Under these circumstances, it is easy to conceive of Wilson reacting more strongly than normal when frustrated by Huerta.1 Wilson’s decision to intervene also reflected his underestimation of the number of lives that would be lost. Wilson relied at least in part on John Lind’s optimistic reports that the Mexican army would not fight. “To dispose of the present regular army will be an easy task, Lind wrote to the president. “If the officers command ‘break ranks’ and say ‘shoo’ they will scatter and never be heard of again except as inmates of jails and almshouses.” Wilson thus believed that U.S. troops could seize the Veracruz customs house with little or no resistance and few casualties. He also took it for granted that the Mexican people would welcome U.S. military force employed against a common enemy, Huerta, assuming that they would view his intervention as assistance in ridding Mexico of a despot.2 Lind was only partially correct, however. Most of the Huertista military did withdraw from Veracruz without fighting. It was largely the civilians who resisted—the very group Wilson had assumed would welcome his actions. Wilson’s naïve belief that the Mexican people would know and accept that the United States was trying to help depose Huerta should have been tempered by earlier Mexican opposition to U.S. heavy-handedness in the region; Mexicans had already rioted against U.S. citizens living in Mexico in 1911 and 1912.3 Wilson’s order to seize the customs house ran afoul of international law because the United States had no legal right to seize a German ship in a Mexican port when the United States was at war with neither country. Measuring his actions, as he often did, by their intent, Wilson had rationalized a loophole, deciding that it would be permissible to seize the customs house once the arms were unloaded into it, because they would no longer be German property, but would not yet be in the possession of the Mexican military. Meeting these requirements would require precise timing. The shipment would not remain in the warehouse long, as trains were already waiting to move the goods inland. The customs...