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45 By autumn 1913, President Woodrow Wilson had committed his administration to removing Huerta’s regime from power in Mexico. Wilson dedicated the United States to this policy at least in part because the ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, had actively aided Gen. Huerta in overthrowing his democratically elected predecessor, Francisco Madero. In President Wilson’s view, since the ambassador was America’s representative, his aid to Huerta made the United States responsible for Huerta’s coup. Moreover, the violent way in which Huerta came to power and the ongoing revolution proved to the U.S. president that Huerta did not represent the “general will” of the Mexican people and that his claim to Mexico’s presidency was illegitimate. President Wilson, however, does not seem to have contemplated the idea that even Mexico’s revolutionaries would not want his support—that Mexicans simply wanted the U.S. government to leave them alone to work out their own problems. Instead, Wilson tried to build support among the other major powers with representatives in Mexico City, especially Britain, Germany, and Japan, for his isolation of Huerta’s regime. The administration was wary of these countries’ intentions in Mexico, suspicions not without merit. Traditionally, other countries had deferred to the United States as the primary foreign power in Mexico, but after Huerta’s coup, one by one, the other nations with economic interests in Mexico recognized his regime, leaving Wilson increasingly isolated in his policies.1 Britain had recognized Huerta’s regime in March 1913, responding to the need for oil, as well as to lobbying from influential businessman Lord Weetman Pearson Cowdray. Cowdray had extensive oil interests in Mexico, finally striking oil there in 1910,afteradecadeofexpensiveexploration.Hewasunwillingtoriskhisinvestment 4 Watchful Waiting, October 1913–April 1914 46 Leading them to the Promised Land by allowing Huerta’s replacement by a revolutionary government—which might oppose the influence of foreign investors—just as he was beginning to earn profits and just as the Royal Navy was switching from coal to oil.2 Initially, Britain had reluctantly backed American policy in Mexico. In July 1913, however, the British minister in Mexico, Francis William Stronge, organized a meeting of European diplomats to pressure the United States to recognize Huerta. The meeting had no effect on President Wilson’s attitude toward Mexico, but it did strain American relations with Britain. London temporarily backed away from the issue, but in October a new British minister arrived in Mexico determined to back Huerta despite Wilson’s objections.3 This new British representative, Sir Lionel Carden, was a career diplomat who thoroughly disliked the United States. He had worked for years to reduce Washington ’s influence in Latin America and increase that of Great Britain. On October 11, 1913,afterdissolvingtheMexicanCongress,Huertaassumeddictatorialpowers.That sameday,CardenpresentedhiscredentialsandstoodatHuerta’ssideasthepresident informed the rest of the diplomatic community of his second coup. By the end of October 1913, only the United States and many Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Chile, had refused to formally recognize Huerta’s government.4 After Huerta announced his coup to the foreign legation in Mexico City, Carden gave an interview that appeared in the New York papers criticizing American policy in Mexico, blaming Washington for the continued unrest, and claiming that Wilson “knew nothing about Mexico.” To Wilson, Bryan, and Lind—each already suspicious of European aims in Mexico—British actions appeared to be deliberately aimed at undermining U.S. policy, a ploy that, if true, would constitute a violation of the generally unspoken European acknowledgment of U.S. primacy in Mexico and Central America. Backing Huerta against U.S. wishes seemed to Washington to constitute a threat to American interests in the region and a deliberate affront to Wilson’s goal of reestablishing constitutionalism in Mexico.5 Huerta sought to take advantage of Wilson’s diplomatic isolation by courting the other major powers interested in Mexico. While London was primarily interested in protecting its Mexican oil interests, Berlin decided to support Huerta as “the only personality who could restore order.” The Germans showed some initial interest in the Mexican petroleum industry, but since, in a war with Britain, Germany would be unable to import Mexican oil they saw little benefit from a large investment in petroleum.6 Berlin was interested in vying with London and Washington as an international great power, however, and thus was willing to position itself as an alternative patron to smaller countries, such as Mexico. Its government was willing to sell Huerta arms...

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