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CHAPTER FOUR "A Morality for Moralists" In uns vollzieht sich, gesetzt, dass ihr eine Formel wollt,-die Selbstaufhebung der Moral.-1 In the preface to On the Genealogy ofMorals, Nietzsche depicts the development of his thoughts on morality. He reveals that his reflections on the descent ("Herkunft") of our moral prejudices were first expressed in his first aphoristic writing Human, All Too Human, though the ideas occurred to him when he was much younger (GM, pref. 2), even from the time when he was only thirteen (GM, pref. 3). Nietzsche's critical thoughts on morality form a central and continuous motive that permeates (and to that extent connects) all of his writings. In section 6 of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche writes "that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown." This is also true of his own philosophy . And nowhere do we find his moral and immoral intentions as obvious as in his treatment of morality itself. In the preface to On the Genealogy ofMorals (GM, pref. 3) Nietzsche speaks of a skepticism2 concerning morality which he calls his "a priori." This same preface serves as a prelude to some important elements of his thinking on morality. Let us have a closer look at it. He writes that his skepticism concerning morality relates to "all that has hitherto been celebrated on earth as morality." We will see that Nietzsche 's critique of morality indeed addresses all morality, at least all morality up to this point in history. In section 6 of the same preface Nietzsche states that for those who ask this kind of question the "belief in morality, in all morality, falters." And in many other places we find I 174 175 I "A Morality for Moralists" Nietzsche speaking about morality or moral philosophy in a very generalizing way: "every morality" (BOE 188), "almost all moralists so far" (BOE 197), "all major moral judgments" (BOE 202), "all moral philosophy so far" (BOE 228), "the whole of morality" (BOE 291). One question we will have to ask is how Nietzsche manages to gather together into one cogent critique so many different moralities and moral theories as can be distinguished in the history of Western civilization . We will return to this question on pp. 205-14. Before answering this question another one arises: what must be the position or standpoint of the one who criticizes all moral standpoints ? This question becomes even more urgent in section 3 of the preface to On the Genealogy. Here Nietzsche wonders what his "a priori " demands from him, almost as if he is speaking about his moral conscience . He specifies this "a priori" as "amoral, or at least immoralistic .,,3 That it is immoral rather than amoral, that is, that it opposes morality rather than situates itself outside of any morality, almost presupposes another moral standpoint. Nietzsche even compares his "a priori" with a sort of "categorical imperative," albeit a very "anti-Kantian " one! When he explains the development of his question (concerning a single critique of all moralities), Nietzsche gives as its ultimate phrasing: "what value do they [that is, these value judgments good and evil] themselves possess? Have they hitherto hiridered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future?" (OM, pref. 3). Doesn't this question presuppose a moral criterion? What does it mean? And especially, how could Nietzsche claim evidence for a criterion like this after having criticized all and every morality? We will return to the question of the morality of Nietzsche's critique of morality in the second half of this chapter. First we will concentrate on the way Nietzsche develops his critique . On this point we also find a useful hint in section 3 of the preface to On the Genealogy ofMorals. In the second part of this section Nietzsche explains how his skepticism regarding morality developed. After having asked his questions in a childish way, that is, asking for the origin of evil within the framework of a theological metaphysics, Nietzsche finds another way of posing these questions: "Under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess?" He discovers this question from his background in "historical and philological schooling" and from "an [3.149.230...

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