Through Bosnian Eyes: The Political Memoirs of a Bosnian Serb

XI The Fate of Serbs in the Cities

M. Pejanovic, THROUGH BOSNIAN EYES XI. THE FATE OF SERBS IN THE CITIES The cities of Bosnia, especially the larger centers such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and Zenica, had substantial Serb populations before the war. In Sarajevo, according to the 1991 census, lived around 150,000 Serbs, and several dozens of thousands who called themselves Yugoslavs but had ethnic Serb origins - the largest single population of Serbs outside Serbia.61 In Tuzla, Mostar and Zenica were between 20,000 and 30,000 Serbs.62 Other towns also had Serbs populations in the thousands - take Bugojno, which had almost 9,000.63 This part of the Serb nation in Bosnia was,· due to its educational and social structure, strong in academic and technical qualifications. Many had high school and university degrees in engineering and technology, and a good number held advanced academic degrees. Apart from the towns of Banja Luka, Trebinje, Bijeljina, Prijedor and Zvornik, now in the Serb entity, the majority of .the Serb intelligentsia were located in the major industrial centers: Sarajevo, 61 OfSarajevo's 527,049 residents, 157,143 (29.8%) declared themselves Serbs in the 1991 census. Another 56,47000.7%) declared themselves "Yugoslavs." StanovniStvo Bosne i Hercegovine (Zagreb: Drzavni zavod za statistiku, 1995), p.15. 62 In Tuzla, 20,271 05.4%) of respondents declared themselves Serbs in 1991 and 21,995 06.7%) declared themselves Yugoslavs. In Mostar, 23,846 08.8%) declared themselves Serbs and 12,76800.1%) declared themselves Yugoslavs. In Zenica, 22,43305.4%) declared themselves-5erbs and 15,65400.8%) declared themselves Yugoslavs. Ibid., pp. 20,22, and 23. 63 Bugojno's population of 46,889 in 1991 included 8,673 08.5%) Serbs and 1,561 (3.3%) Yugoslavs. Ibid., p. 17. 129 M. ·Pejanovic, THROUGH BOSNIAN EYES Mostar, Zenica, Tuzla, Travnik, Konjic;Bugojno. In the 1990 multiparty elections, these Bosnian Serbs voted overwhelmingly for the civil democratic parties: the co~lition of the SDP and· the·.DSS, the Reformists, and the Liberals, as shown by an analysis of the voting in urban centers. For example, in Brcko, Mostar, Zenica and Sarajevo, a high percentage of democratic civic coalitions stood in the elections. In Tuzla in 1990, the local government was taken over by such a bloc. This part of the Serb ethnic body was not nationalist: national ideologies did not prevail in the group consciousness, nor was national homogenization favored. This fact became evident in the first days of the aggression against Bosnia, especially when the shelling of Sarajevo began. Most Serbs stayed in the city, despite calls from the SDS to leave, summons sent first to its own members and then to all Serb citizens; Nor did Serbs leave the cities in large numbers in the first months of the war. At the end of April and beginning of ,May 1992, my neighbors and I often talked about the troubling situation, for Sarajevo was already under bombardment. Rizo Selmanagic, an antifascist from the Second World War, said, "You know, the real beginning of KaradziC's political defeat lies in the fact that all Serbs did not leave the city in a body, the moment the attack started. Karadzic counted on their leaving Sarajevo. But while we are still living together with Serbs, we will he able to cope psychologically with all pressures, all the suffering, all the attacks." At the time I did not see any special significance in what he said, but as the war drew on, this theory from an old antifascist was confirmed over and over, until the moment came for resolving the status of Sarajevo, at the Dayton peace talks in November 1995. ' After the peace agreement was signed, and Sarajevo's unity and integrity·was assured, Karadzic did everything he could to persuade the Serbs living in the suburbs to migrate from the region at the start of 1996.64 This stemmed from his refusal to acknowledge 64 In the days before several BSA-occupied Sarajevo suburbs were tobe turned over to Federation control, Serb gangs terrorized its Serb residents and burned many buildings in a drive to force all Serbs to leave these neighborhoods. The gang terror proceeded unimpeded by NATO troops of the international peacekeepingImplementationForce (lFOR), who were ordered not to interfere. US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has called this episode his "worst moment" in the post-war history of Bosnia. . 130 M. Pejanovic, THROUGH BOSNIAN EYES the defeat of...