Machado de Assis, the Brazilian Pyrrhonian

Introduction

Introduction This is not the first study to examine the skepticism exhibited in the fiction of Machado de Assis.1 It is, however, the first in which Machado's skepticism is identified as belonging to the Pyrrhonian tradition. This tradition originates with Pyrrho of Elis (from around 365 to 275 BC), flourishes from the first century BC to the third AD, and revives in the Renaissance, having become since then a major intellectual challenge to modem and contemporary philosophy. Sextus Empiricus's writings are the only surviving primary source of information about ancient skeptical thought. In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus provides a comprehensive characterization of ancient Pyrrhonism. -He defines it as an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state ofmental suspense and next to a state of"unperturbedness" or quietude. (PH 1.8) Sextus carefully indicates that Pyrrhonism is not a philosophical system in the sense of an interrelated body of doctrines. He calls it, instead, an ability. The Pyrrhonian does not hold the position that knowledge cannot be achieved, nor is he committed to any of the arguments he uses to attack dogmatism. He has no doctrine about the possibility of attaining knowledge. All he has is an ability to examine any piece ofknowledge held by dogmatic thinkers (defined by Sextus as those who hold doctrines about the nature of things) in order to check its cogency . The arguments the Pyrrhonian uses in this examination are eliminated as soon as they do the job of refuting the doctrine under consideration in the same way that purgatives are expelled together with the humors they are intended to remove (PH 1.206 and M 8.479-81). This elimination is brought about by the equipollence established by the Pyrrhonian: since the counterarguments he brings forth against a doctrine are as persuasive as the doctrine they contradict, both are discarded. The Pyrrhonian reports that because he has not found any conclusive evidence either that there is some criterion for truth or that there is no such criterion, he continues his examination (PH 1.3). 1 Introduction Sextus's definition alludes to what can be described as the Pyrrhonian's journey. The Pyrrhonian-to-be begins like any "man oftalent" disturbed by conflicting appearances (pH 1.12). For example, honey appears sweet at one moment and sour at another. These conflicting appearances create a mental disturbance . The Pyrrhonian-to-be then begins an inquiry (zetesis), hoping to attain tranquility (ataraxia) by ascertaining the true nature of honey. According to Sextus, this initial stage of the Pyrrhonian-to-be's journey is one that the dogmatist also experiences . The dogmatic philosopher, however, finds tranquility by discovering (what !Ie thinks is) the true nature of the thing. For instance, he postulates a theory of what honey really is, that explains to his satisfaction the conflicting appearances, thereby resolving his internal confusion. The Pyrrhonian-to-be holds that dogmatic tranquility is only attained through rash or precipitate judgment. More rigorous inquiry shows either that the explanation ofthe conflicting appearance is not satisfactory (it may have some logical flaw, for example), that there are other theories inconsistent with the one in question that also explain the appearances, or that there are other appearances or arguments-overlooked by dogmatists-that invalidate the explanation. Dogmatic tranquility is not solid after all, because none of the doctrines the Pyrrhonian has examined have resisted a more rigorous inquiry. . Thus the Pyrrhonian's journey differs from the dogmatist's in that instead of arriving at a doctrine, his inquiry (zetesis) leads him to equipollence. Unable to choose one doctrine or its contrary, he suspends judgment (epoche) and unexpectedly attains the tranquility (ataraxia) he initially hoped to achieve by finding the truth (PH 1.29). While' one can understand why dogmatic tranquility may be fragile, Sextus does not explain why ataraxia follows from epoche. Some explanations of this psychological outcome of suspension of judgment as well as criticisms and solutions to problems in the Pyrrhonian's journey will be discussed in connection with Machado's text in the body of this study. Sextus reports that the main arguments the Pyrrhonians use in their inquiry about philosophical dogmas were classified by earlier Pyrrhonians in various numbers of tropoi or modes. Sextus lists one set of tropoi supposedly collected by the 2 [18.220.154.41...