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C H A P T E R 7 RESISTANCE TO THE GERMANS The story of Albanian resistance to the Germans is one of complexity and controversy. Although the resistance picture in Albania was by no means simple under the Italians, the arrival of the German forces contributed to the further splintering of the movement. And astute German policy did much to reduce the effectiveness of the many pieces as well as help insure the failure of various efforts aimed at reconciliation. The Germans succeeded in pitting the various elements of the resistance against each other, ultimately co-opting all but the partisans. It is reasonable to argue that in doing so the Germans did much to insure a partisan victory. But at the same time, German policy also allowed for the subjugation of Albania with a comparatively small number of second-level troops, often Russian former POWs. In a military sense, the strategy of the resistance can hardly be considered successful. In a political sense, the partisans were able to insure dominance in a postwar Albania. Resistance to the Germans began rather tentatively, principally because of the German invasion’s speed and effectiveness. The Italian collapse resulted in a momentary power vacuum that the resistance groups––partisans, nationalists , and independent chieftains—seem to have taken advantage of, each grabbing as much territory as possible in anticipation of an Allied invasion. Abaz Kupi took Kruja in the northwest, and Muharrem Bajraktari took Kukës in the northeast. The partisans, who were much more active, not only consolidated their hold on much of the southern countryside but also occupied Korça, Gjirokastra, Elbasan, and Berat. The BK, by now somewhat less prepared to pursue military activity, was active in the area around Vlora.1 But this activity proved to be little more than a minor obstacle once German forces poured into Albania. Although the nationalist chiefs and the partisans could occupy virtually undefended towns, they were less willing to actively resist battle-hardened German troops. There seem to have been a number of reasons why this was the case. First, most Albanians believed that with the Italian collapse, an Allied invasion was imminent. The Allies did much to spread this idea widely, in what was called 189 operation “Bodyguard,” an attempt to draw attention away from the projected Normandy landings.2 None of the groups in Albania was willing to expend scant resources against the Germans, who they assumed would soon be removed by the Allies. And the Albanians had a much higher regard for German military prowess than they had had for the Italians. It is generally accepted, therefore, that the German invasion encountered little resistance, precisely how much will remain in dispute. Hermann Neubacher maintains in his book, although he certainly is exaggerating , that the Germans encountered no unfriendly act on the part of the Albanians. He asserted that the BK did not resist the Germans,3 and this is supported by Schliep, who accepted the assurances of Mithat Frashëri that although the BK had declared itself against the Axis during the Italian occupation , it would take no hostile act against the Germans.4 While a British BLO argued that Kupi “fought like a lion,” Neubacher reported that Kupi remained in the woods.5 It seems, however, that both the BK and Kupi made some initial limited anti-German moves. Abaz Ermenji, a member of the BK central council, resisted the Germans brie¶y, and Kupi struck at the Germans once on 21 September but then decided to await developments before committing his forces. The discrepancy in accounts likely stems from the fact that the Germans were often unaware of who their attackers were. But similar discrepancies can be found regarding partisan resistance. Socialist historiography suggests that the partisans ¤ercely resisted the German invasion, in¶icting some 3,000 dead in one battle on 14 September.6 While this is certainly an exaggeration, the partisans, as usual, did most of the ¤ghting . The partisans had demonstrated their attitude toward the Germans early by attacking a German convoy on the road from Korça to Ioannina in July, prior to the invasion. The Germans responded by destroying the town of Borova near Korça and killing 107 civilians.7 German documents mention some further hostile action in September, organized and carried out by communist bands.8 The Germans responded to this scattered resistance, as they had to the July attack, with swift and brutal reprisals, hoping to quickly discourage further...

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