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C H A P T E R 4 ITALIAN REPRESSION AND THE BEGINNING OF RESISTANCE The Italians made many mistakes in Albania, not the least of which was assuming that they could win over a majority of Albanians at all. The Albanian attitude toward the Italians in 1939 ranged from indifference to suspicion to passive antipathy to hatred; by late 1940 the latter was the prevailing emotion. Unlike with their feelings about the Germans after 1943, the Albanians never respected the Italians, although with increased repression came fear. The Albanian attitude toward the Italians was guided in part by the mistaken assumption that Albanian arms had actually driven Italian armies into the sea in 1920. This national myth had been fostered by Zog and did the Albanian nation a disservice because it encouraged Albanians to underestimate the Italians and often not to take them seriously. Growing Italian Unpopularity This overly negative attitude about the Italians was reinforced during the 1920s by the impression left by a few hundred Italian artisans and small merchants who had been abandoned in Albania after World War I and who begged soldi to survive. Mussolini’s restructuring of the Italian government and his military exploits in Spain and Ethiopia did little to alter the impression of many Albanians. Educated Albanians considered the Italians to be parvenu in the European community of nations, newcomers who were really not in a position to bring culture or economic well-being. There were intangible considerations as well. Albanians did not like the entire Italian Weltanschauung, and they disliked what they considered the weak, nonmasculine way the Italians carried themselves and behaved. Many Albanians believed Italians to be liars and dissimulators.1 The vast sums of money the Italians spent in Albania did little to alter this attitude. This was partially the case because many Albanians believed that 89 Italian money was not really meant for Albanian development but rather for Italian interests exclusively. Many Albanians believed that the Italians hoped for Albania’s ¤nancial destruction under Zog and saw to the squandering of large sums of money to help bring this about. After the invasion some Italian policies were based to a certain degree on altruism, but even these seemed to mis¤re. Add to this background the blunders and mismanagement, and it is not dif¤cult to imagine how the Italians became increasingly unpopular. Even those Albanians who had initially supported the Italians—either out of a sense of saving what could be saved or out of simple venality—began to turn away as the excesses of the fascist movement began to have an impact. As Italian mistakes multiplied, Albanian opposition grew. As opposition grew, resistance increased. The Italians responded by grasping for a policy, but settled for increased repression, tempered by sporadic and often erratic concessions. The Italian administration of Albania was not successful, and many of Rome’s problems were self-imposed. On the whole, the Italians behaved badly. After an initial burst of activity they settled into disorganization, lack of direction , corruption, and a preference for form over content. Corruption was widespread and reached the highest levels of the administration. Albania, and the vast sums that Rome spent there, provided a unique opportunity for countless Italian adventurers and con men, as well as a temptation for contractors and suppliers who might otherwise have remained legitimate. Because the sums were so vast, a considerable bureaucracy grew up to administer the money. The fascist bureaucrats did much to secure jobs for their friends and contracts for¤rms in which they had a personal interest. The marble buildings that the Italians constructed for various fascist organizations have been mentioned. It is not surprising that Mussolini’s private secretary was intimately connected with the marble quarries at Carrara.2 Ciano himself became involved. With the large secret funds at his disposal for miscellaneous expenses in Albania, Ciano initiated a vast network of corruption. When the Italian police discovered it, they determined not even to inform Mussolini. This is not to suggest that corruption was something new and shocking to the Albanians. But under Zog it had been more or less limited to the court and its immediate vicinity. With the Italians it became much more widespread and very obvious. Albanians quickly became aware that high Italian government and party people had ¤nancial interests in speci¤c projects and that enormous prices were paid for particular construction projects and deliveries, far in excess of their actual worth. Giovanni Giro, the...

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