Army of Francis Joseph

5: The End of an Age: 1860-1866

5 The End of an Age: 1860-1866 On the field of Solferino, Francis Joseph lost confidence in his generalship. Thereafter, although he was personally brave, he no longer assumed actual command in battle, though on occasion he did not hesitate to interfere from afar with the conduct of operations. Above all, he jealously guarded his prerogatives as supreme war lord and he remained intensely involved in all questions concerning the military establishment, though his interests focused on matters of regimental detail. As Bardolff put it rather tactfully, the emperor had great enthusiasm for the "purely soldierly matters: discipline, elan, and aggressiveness." 1 Indeed, Francis Joseph first and foremost considered himselfa soldier and, much to the distress of the liberal middle classes, he continued to wear uniform on almost every occasion .2 But even the emperor's enthusiastic support could not hide the fact that the army had given a very inept performance in Italy. Military discomfiture led to a crisis in the empire and to certain changes in the military establishment. In the empire the neo-absolutist course was first modified and eventually abandoned in favor of a constitutional accommodation with the two strongest nationalities-the Germans and the Magyars. In turn, the emergence of constitutional government, though without much effect on internal military administration, brought about new patterns of army control. But these changes were made reluctantly and neither the problem of military-civilian coordination in the shaping of policy nor the vexing nationality problems were resolved. In fact, the new political dispensations tended to render these conflicts even more acute. The nationality problem acted both as the incentive and as the brake on military reform. Shortly after the close of the Italian campaign, a Swiss observer, Colonel Wilhelm Riistow, remarked that the multinational Habsburg army achieved and maintained its cohesion by appealing to the soldier's pride in his calling and by fostering his corporate loyalty. But these two factors, Riistow continued, were extremely vulnerable to the stresses imposed by defeat.3 The lessons of the Italian campaign revealed the necessity for a new departure in military affairs, but the problem of divisive nationalism, of which the leading soldiers were only too well aware, created a dilemma. Any fundamental solution depended on a complete reorganization of the political structure of the monarchy. The generals, however, 56 The End of an Age 57 were conservative men whose dynastic allegiance and preoccupation with tradition conflicted with drastic changes.4 Even within these limits, flexibility and minor concessions might have remedied much, but the traditionalists considered all innovations dangerous. Archduke Albrecht , who had returned to active duty and gained a good reputation as a corps commander under Radetzky, and Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek, the newly promoted popular hero of Solferino, were convinced that the army was the only reliable barrier between the throne and renewed revolution. They believed that it had to be protected at all costs from the pernicious influences of liberalism and nationalism and that this could only be done by holding fast to the traditional values, the "old army spirit." As Albrecht told his confidant, Feldmarschall Leutnant Count Franz Folliot de Crenneville-Poutet, a conservative high aristocrat who had replaced Griinne as adjutant general, "let us hope that our supreme war lord stands firm against the war minister's innovation craze. Ifhe gives in, then he no longer can count on the old Austrian army."5 Crenneville, Benedek, and most other leading soldiers fully shared the archduke's sentiments. Loyalty to the dynasty was the prime article of their faith; they considered civilians, especially the professional and business classes, suspect and even dangerous. Benedek described them in a confidential circular to his officers. There were, he wrote' 'international revolutionaries, lawyers and doctors without practices, ambitious and money-hungry journalists, dissatisfied professors and schoolteachers," who, together with "debt-ridden nobles and cowardly magnates," plotted against the monarchy.6 And, as he proclaimed during an imperial review at Verona in 1862, it was against the external and the internal enemies that the army existed "to serve, fight, and if necessary die with honor for their emperor and supreme warlord." 7 In this fashion the army leadership isolated itself from criticism and from the pressures for change. At the same time, defeat produced a crisis of confidence in the leading soldiers who displayed what an Austrian historian recently described as "the desire to avoid responsibility, coupled with a remarkable lack of energy and drive."8 This lack of will and...