Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914

CHAPTER EIGHT - The Scutari Crisis: 1913

CHAPTER EIGHT The Scutari Crisis: 1913 Nicholas's renewed attack on Scutari prompted the European Powers to initiate a naval demonstration along the Montenegrin coast. The crisis was front-page news throughout April and early May, as all of Europe wondered whether the international naval action would succeed in bringing the recalcitrant Balkan kingdom to its knees and in the process eliminate the growing possibility of a general European war. In a final attempt to avoid a showdown between Montenegro and the Concert of Europe, Sir Arthur Nicolson advised Jovo Popovic , the Montenegrin delegate in London, to "accept without delay" the decision of the Powers, for even if Scutari were to fall, he argued, Montenegro would eventually have to bow to Europe's will and evacuate the town. Popovic and his countrymen did not agree. They believed that they could challenge the Powers and win, but if necessary, they were prepared to die. l Eager to begin the demonstration, Berchtold on 1 April ordered a division of Austrian ships to Bar, where they would await the arrival of the other contingents.2 After initial hesitation, Germany sent the cruiser Breslau to join the Austrian ships; the Italians , although annoyed by Berchtold's haste, followed suit.3 In St. Petersburg, Sergei Sazonov faced difficult choices. He wished to remain true to the decision of the London conference, but he did not dare alienate public opinion, which had already threatened to oust him should he not support Montenegro's claim to Scutari.4 To appease pan-Slav sentiment, he declined Russian participation in the naval demonstration but on 2 April approved such action by his French and British allies. With Russia's sanction, their warships sailed for Bar, and the naval demonstration was under way.5 135 136 CHAPTER EIGHT Although five of the Great Powers had agreed to participate in the demonstration and the sixth had sanctioned it, their diplomats still debated details of the operation, such as the authority of the naval commanders and the extent of their zone of operation.6 At first the commanders, led by British Admiral Cecil Burney, possessed a large measure of independence. But when on 5 April they demanded Nicholas's immediate submission and threatened a total blockade of the Montenegrin coast should he refuse, Grey, Nicolson , and others decided to tighten the chain of command over the operation. Henceforth, the commanders could take no action without consulting their respective governments.7 The Powers also debated the scope of their blockade. Berchtold wished to cover the entire Montenegrin-Albanian coast from Bar to the important Albanian port of Durres. The French and others argued for a more restricted zone. After heated discussion, the conference decided to limit its operations from Bar to the Drin River, a point just beyond Shengjin, the Adriatic port closest to Scutari.8 This decision came too late to prevent Serbian troop landings at Shengjin-Iandings that encouraged the Montenegrins to continue their resistancebut the Powers hoped through their naval demonstration to prevent any similar action in the future.9 The naval blockade formally began at 8 A.M. on 10 April, the Powers terming it "pacific" and emphasizing that the squadron should fire only if fired upon. The British admirality was firm in delineating the blockade's limits: "[It] does not imply any kind of warlike action such as the occupation of places on the coast, or the landing of men, in which you should restrain from joining.,,10 The naval demonstration scored its first success almost immediately: Serbian troops on Greek transport ships in Salonica harbor were ordered to disembark, and the Greek government announced that henceforth its ships would not convoy Serbian soldiers to the Albanian theater. 11 The Montenegrin government officially decried the presence of the squadron as a violation of Montenegrin sovereignty and a breach of the Powers' so-called neutrality. 12 Nicholas dismissed the threat posed by the maritime action with feigned indifference, though he threatened to fire on the warships should they move against Montenegro. Rumors abounded in Berlin that he was surrounded by hawkish ministers and generals, who were more determined than he to take Scutari, and that the king had been intimidated The Scutari Crisis: 1913 137 by threats of a palace coup if he did not cooperate. Berchtold, for one, took no stock in this gossip; he remained convinced that Nicholas alone was responsible for Montenegrin obstinacy. 13...