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CHAPTERI N I N E Oblivion and Transcendence The next four chapters (16-19) introduce a number ofproblems having to do with forgetting and with the possibility oftranscending ordinary experience in consciousness and rising to a union with perfect divine wisdom. Some ofAugustine's queries here have been called abstruse,l but he admits that sometimes one becomes a mystery to oneself.2 Analysis 10.16.24: ''When I name oblivion, and likewise recognize what I am naming, what would be the source ofmy recognition, if I did not remember it?" (Cum oblivionem nomina atque itidem agnosco quod nomino, unde agnosceram nisi meminissem?). Is Augustine asking how one can remember forgetting something? Is there an important distinction to be made between using a name correctly and knowing its full meaning? In our comment we will see that there are different ways ofnot knowing something. To some extent, Augustine does explore this difficulty when he remarks next, "IfI had forgotten this meaning, I should not be able at all to recognize what the sound's function is" (quam si oblitus essem, quid ille valeret sonus, agnoscere utique non valerem). This might be true oftotal amnesia in reference to a given meaning. Thus a person might be unable to define the meaning of"mass," as used in physics, and yet be able to spell the word correctly. Another difficulty is presented when Augustine points out that "when I remember my memory, the very memory is present to itself' (cum memoriam memini, per se ipsam sibi praesto est ipsa memoria). Of course, there is a difference between recalling the meaning of"memory" in general and the act or content ofa given case of remembering (say, recalling one's mother's middle name). This individual instance of recalling or forgetting would not erase the use ofmemory in regard to other matters. Nor would forgetting one thing entail the absence ofall awareness ofmemory. I 166 167 I Oblivion and Transcendence Ambiguity also appears with the next statement: "When I remember oblivion, both memory and oblivion are present" (cum vero memini oblivionem, et memoria praesto est et oblivio). Again, it is not clear in this sentence whether the terms "oblivion" and "memory" are to be understood in a general or a particular sense. Augustine was not an expert in classical logic; he did not make use ofthe term universale for the meaning of a genus or species. Boethius introduced the problem ofuniversals to Latin philosophy, using the term "universal," later. Ofcourse, the nature ofgeneral terms is known to Augustine. But his difficulty is repeated in the question: "But what is oblivion except the privation ofmemory?" (sed quid est oblivio nisi privatio memoriae?). As suggested earlier, total privation of recall (amnesia in the complete sense) would be required before all memory acts became impossible. These and other questions in section 24 are not trivial; they serve to alert the reader to the bases ofAugustine's admission that he does not understand forgetfulness: "Who will understand what it is?" (quis comprehendet quomodo sit?). Even modern psychology may not have all the answers to questions about the subconscious mind. Comment: Latin as a language for philosophical·discussion lacked the precision that Boethius (a logician) gave it in the century after Augustine. The Greeks had a word for "forgetting" (amnesis), and to speak ofrecollecting they used the term "anamnesis"; it means notforgetting , or remembering. This may not have been the actual etymology ofanamnesis (which is also used in English), but, from at least the time ofPlato, philosophical discussions ofrecollection often included its contrast with oblivion. In some cases, forgetting and remembering are contradictories, and in other instances they are not. One may forget one item ofknowledge and yet be quite mindful of other previously acquired bits ofinformation. From Augustine's examination of three kinds of forgetting, early in his career (Soliloquies 2.20.34), we know that he was aware ofat least that many sorts ofoblivion. First, you may have forgotten something (say, how to demonstrate a conclusion in geometry), and friends may say: Is it this, or that? You may reject their suggestions and still not recall what you once knew. Second, ifsomeone tells you that you smiled a few days after you were born, you would not dare deny this, provided your informant is a reliable witness. Without any memory ofthis event in infancy, you might still believe that it is so. And third, Augustine suggests that you may encounter something and remember that you have seen it...

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