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CHAPTERI F 0 U R Cause and Effect Text Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section IV Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations ofthe Understanding All the objects ofhuman reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, relations ofideas, and matters offact. Ofthe first kind are the sciences ofgeometry, algebra, and arithmetic, and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square ofthe two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions ofthis kind are discoverable by the mere operation ofthought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters offact, which are the second objects ofhuman reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence oftheir truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood . Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may, therefore, be a subject worthy ofcuriosity, to ~enquire what is the nature ofthat evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns, and therefore our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of I 64 65 I Cause and Effect so important an enquiry, may be the more excusable, while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroYing that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy , if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but ratheran incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public. All reasonings concerning matter offact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means ofthat relation alone we can go beyond the evidence ofour memory and senses. Ifyou were to ask a man, why he believes any matter offact, which is absent, (for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France) he would give you a reason, and this reason would be some other fact, as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men on that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connection between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious . The hearing ofan articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person. Why? Because these are the effects ofthe human make and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature , we shall find that they are founded on the relation ofcause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral . Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other. Ifwe would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge ofcause and effect. I shall venture to.affirm, as a general proposition, which admits ofno exception, that the knowledge ofthis relation is not, in any instance , attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience , when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each...

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