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~ HA R RE ~ IReflections on Parts 2 and 3 ofthe.Wissenschaftslehre I Part 2 . . . FoundationofTheoretical Knowledge At the very beginning ofpart 2 ofthe Wissen,schaftslehre, Fichte remarksthat with thecompletion ·ofpart 1, and with it the establishment of the fundamental synthesis of self and non-self, the formal validity ofhis exercise in reflection is complete and the ground laid for the content (Gehalt) of every other possible synthesis. It may then be well to consider some ofthese implicit contents and examine how they are made explicit in the second and third parts of the Wissenschaftslehre. In part 2, the theoretical part ofthe Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte will consider the meaning and implications ofthe principle that the selfposits itselfas limited or determined by the non-self, the self as open to limitation by the non-self. However, he will immediately grant, here as elsewhere (for example, SW 1:295), that the theoretical principle rests upon the practical one, namely: The selfposits the non-selfas limited or determined by the self This is in accordance with the primacy ofthe practical reason, a doctrine Fichte takes over from Kant. The self always looks beyond theory to practice (SW 1:178). In other words, a particular non-self gets posited (theoretically ) as something for a consciousness only in virtue ofsome practical consideration. It is because I posit myselfas lawyer, for example, that I begin to "see" cases. Or as Fichte will say later, reason cannot even be theoretical unless it is practical; even representation is founded upon it (SW 1:264). For example, ifmy ideal as a health professional is to save lives, then I will begin to see in my patien~s the things I need to be concerned about; I will begin to see "things":such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol levels, etc. I 102 103 I Reflections on Part.s 2 and 3 ofWissenschaftslehre Let us take another example: it is because I have the ideal, the felt practical need ofwomen's liberation, that I see pornography as demeaning to women and as exploitation and thus as something to be opposed. Although Fichte does grant the theoretical point that in order for something to be considered as an evil, for example, it must be able to be thought (Denkbarkeit [SW 1:126-27]). And, in virtue of the reciprocal relationship between self and non-self in making women's liberation my cause and thus opposing pornography, the self determines its self: I become an antipornography advocate. lAs Fichte says later, the selfis, by its nature, determinable only to the extent that it posits itself as determinable, and only thus can it determine itself(SW 1:211). That point made, Fichte can then proceed to consider the theoretical implications of the principle, the implications for human knowledge as such. He does this, in part, by making a series ofhistorical references. In the first place, he insists that there is no artificial point ofunion between the selfand the non-self. He is referring here, one may suspect, to Descaftes's pineal gland as the intermediary between body and soul. Fichte does not need something like a pineal gland because, for him,the body is both selfand non-self: it is selfinsofar as the body acts in accordance with the will; it is non-self insofar as it does not. And he insists that there is a continuity between the two. However, this would be the case not only with the non-selfbody but with any non-self. There is a quantity (freedom) of reality (activity ) posited in the selfalong with a corresponding quantity ofnegation posited in the lion-self. According to Fichte, this is what Kant means by the category of relation, the concept of reciprocity or interdetermination (Wechselbestimmung [SW 1:131]). Fichte also makes an oblique reference to Spinoza's principle, "Omnis determinatio est negatio." However, he turns it around. Instead of saying that "every determination is a negation," Fichte seems to be saying that "every negation is a determination," in the sense that every negation of reality, that is, every negation of activity in the self(and, thus, a positing·of activity in the non-self), in accordance with the reciprocal relationship between the two, represents a determination of the self. If I posit myself as a painter of landscapes, for example, then I start perceiving reality as a painter would, namely in terms offigure and color. I will thereby be determined by that which I perceive in virtue ofthe negation ofactivity in...

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