Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre of 1794: A Commentary on Part 1

PART TWO: Text and Commentary

P T A R W ~IText and Commentary Part I Fundamental Principles ofthe Entire Science ofKnowledge I§1. First, Absolutely Unconditioned Principle 1,91 Our task is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge. This can be neither proved nor defined, ifit is to be an absolutely primary principle.·· . Wir haben den absolut-ersten, schlechthin unbedingten Grundsatz alles menschlichen Wissens aufzusuchen. Beweisen, oder bestimmen laBt er sich nicht, wenn er absolut-erster Grundsatz sein solI. In Fichte the necessity ofsearching for such a single, originary and absolutely unconditioned first principle was given impetus by Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823) (cf. Daniel Breazeale, "Between Kant and Fichte," 785-821). Such an absolutely first principle can be neither proved nor defined. For example, it is impossible to prove the commutative law in mathematics--either one accepts it as selfevident , assumes it as a basic postulate ofmathematics, or takes up a different field. It should be noted that Fichte's use of the word Satz, as in Grundsatz (first or primary principle), can be rendered either sentence or proposition. He has no reason for distinguishing between the two. It is intended to express that Act which does not and cannot appear among the empirical states ofour consciousness , but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible.*In describing this Act, there is I 18 19 I Text and Commentary less risk that anyone will perhaps thereby fail to think what he should-the nature ofour mind has already taken care ofthat-than that he will thereby think what he should not. This makes it necessary to reflect on what one might at first take it to be, and to abstract from everything that does not really belong to it. *This has been overlooked by all who insist at this point, either that what the first proposition asserts ifnot included among the facts of consciousness, or that it contradicts them. Er solI diejenige Tathandlung ausdriicken, die unten den empirischen Bestimmungen unsers BewuBtseins nicht vorkommt, noch vorkommen kann, sondern vielmehr allem BewuBtsein zum Grunde liegt, und allein es moglich macht.*Bei Darstellung dieser Tathandlung ist weniger zu befiirchten, daB man sich etwa dabei dasjenige nicht denken·werde, was man sich zu denken hat-dafiir ist durch die Natur unsers Geistes schongesorgt-als, daB man sich dabei denken werde, was man nicht zu denken hat. Dies macht eine Reflexion tiber dasjenige, was man etwa zunachst dafiir halten konnte, und eine Abstraktion von allem, was nicht wirklich dazu gehort, notwendig. *Dies haben aIle diejenigen iibersehen, die da erinnern, entweder: was der erste Grundsatz besage, komme unter den Tatsachen des BewuBtseins nicht vor, oder es widerspreche denselben. "IT IS INTENDED TO EXPRESS THAT ACT ..." The originative Act Fichte here refers to as a Tathandlung is, literally, a deed-act, a fact-producing act, as distinguished from a Tatsache (cf. the next paragraph ), something done, a fact or matter produced. According to Wolfgang Janke, Tathandlung is Fichte's express term for the originary synthetic unity of self-consciousness (Fichte: Sein und Reflexion, 71). "IN DESCRIBING THIS ACT ..." Fichte is attempting to describe what is going on behind actual consciousness, what lies at its basis, zum Grunde liegt. According to Peter Baumanns (Fichtes ursprilngliches System, 214ff.), for Fichte, Handeln is the same as the intellectual intuition, with its background in Kant (cf. the Introduction); which is, briefly, doing something (for example, knowing) coupled with the awareness that I am the one that is doing it. As Fichte puts it in the Sittenlehre, intellectual intuition is the immediate intuition of the self's own activity (SW 4:86; AA 1:5/91). This originative act cannot itselfbe represented-it is not a Vorstellung-it can only be exhibited or described (it is a Darstellung). The choice ofwords here points to the fundamental difference between Fichte and Reinhold. 20 I PART TWO Jiirgen Stolzenberg argues that darstellen in the earlier Fichte becomes setzen (positing) in the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 (Fichtes Begriffder intellektuellen Anschauung, 164). The selfcan, ofcourse, be exhibited (dargestellt), or better, self-posited; it cannot be represented (vorgestellt), since it is not an object, not even a possible object , ofexperience. ".•• TO ABSTRACT FROM EVERYTHING THAT DOES NOT REALLY BELONG TO IT ••." Abstraction in Fichte, and in the idealist tradition generally , means separation (Absonderung), the separation ofmere form from content, which occurs through an act offreedom (cf. SW 1:67...