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PAR o N ~ IIntroduction In 1798 in the Athenaeum, the literary organ ofthe early German romantics, Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) published the following fragment: "The French Revolution, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and Goethe's Meister are the most important trend-setting events (Tendenzen) ofthe age."! One might wonder what a political event (the French Revolution of 1789), a Bildungsroman (Goethe's 1796 novel Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre), and an abstruse philosophical work (Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre of 1794) might have in common. Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, which became the model for any number ofromantic novels, is about the gradual education and development ofa freewheeling hero in search of his own identity; the novel is about freedom. According to Fichte, the French Revolution is important for the whole ofhumanity by providing a text for the rights and dignity ofthe human being (SW 6:39). The French Revolution is also about freedom, liberte. And Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre is about freedom, as is his whole philosophy; he writes in a letter to the philosopher Karl Leonhard Reinhold of8 January 1800, "My system is from beginning to end but an analysis ofthe concept offreedom.''2 In other words, what these major tendencies of the age have in common is what will become the hallmark for most ofthe nineteenth century, and a good part oftwentieth, namely freedom. When I think ofFichte, I think ofBeethoven. Not the Beethoven of the Sixth, or Pastoral, Symphony; that is more like Schelling, whose philosophy ofnature and art appealed so strongly to the early German romantic poets. Nor do I mean the Beethoven ofthe monumental Ninth SYmphony; that is more like Hegel. Rather, I think of Beethoven's Third Symphony, the Eroica. It strikes me as very Fichtean. Indeed, the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 arises out ofthe same sort of Sturm und Drang, the storm and stress of his own I 1 2 I PART ONE personal life. Some"writers work best under pressure. And the press of academic duties, ofintellectual and personal problems, was most certainly characteristic ofthe period just prior to, and immediately following, Fichte's appointment to a university post at Jena in 1794. It must be recognized that Fichte is a philosophical genius of the first water. And the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 is his most important work, with part 1 representing the heart and soul of that work. Having said this, however, it must immediately be added that the philosopher was less than successful in setting down his thought or his system in a fashion commensurate with the level of his insight . This is one ofthe reasons why the Wissenschaftslehre, especially part 1, cries out for a commentary. It is possible to read some works in the history of philosophy without a guide, even though a commentary may furnish the historical background and context or uncover aspects that would be less obvious to the casual reader. Not so with Fichte. Indeed, Fichte's subsequent attempts-failed attempts , many would say-at formulating his philosophy may be read as themselves simply so many commentaries upon the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794. Even the works he produced on morals and politics bear upon this single effort. His System der Sittenlehre and the Grundlage des Naturrechts each carry the subtitle nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre (According to the Principles ofthe Wissenschaftslehre). Indeed, one might characterize Fichte's quest to write the ultimate Wissenschaftslehre as but an example of the striving after an unattainable ideal so characteristic ofromanticism, whose intellectual structure he best describes. Several reasons might be adduced to account for Fichte's difficulty in getting his philosophy down in the desired form. In the first place, one should note that in philosophy it is not easy to say something the first time it is said. To bring original thinking to language requires not only the working out ofnew modes ofthought but also the creation of a new language in.which to express them. On the other hand, Dieter Henrich argues that with Fichte's attempt to present and discuss self-consciousness, the basic principle ofhis philosophy , with the entirely new status given to it, he had no option but to use the language ofthings in order to talk about something, namely consciousness as an act, which is not some-thing.3 But there is something even deeper going on here. Fichte was attempting to offer a system, and a system ofhuman freedom at that. Now, given the Kantian context out of which Fichte comes, system-as in the system ofnature-means necessity, the very opposite...

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