Ockham on the Virtues

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION IOn Medieval Psychology Ockham begins by establishing six basic conclusions regarding virtuous acts. A medieval Aristotelian, he assumes that virtues are states or habits; he distinguishes between acts and habits of virtue. Ockham speaks of eliciting acts and producing habits. Habits are modifications in a subject produced naturally by acts; they are the effects of acts on the soul. But habits are also dispositions that act as causes; they incline the soul to elicit the same kind of acts that originally produced the habits in question. 'Habit' can refer to any modification of a faculty, including the behavioral dispositions of athletes. In moral theory, however, we are concerned with volitional and/or intellectual habits-with the sort of habits that prompt us to act worthily or unworthily. Modern English distinguishes sharply between character (the state resulting from habituation) and training (the process of habituation). By contrast, medievals, following Aristotle's example , use forms of the same word to describe moral development ; they translate the terms 'ethos' and 'ethismos' with the noun (habitus) and the verb (habituare).l Unlike classical Aristotelians, however, medievals also allow for habits produced 1. C. Kalinowski discusses the ambiguities of Aristotle's usage of the term translated as habit in "La Theorie aristotelicienne des habitus intellectuels," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 43 (1959): 248-60. For a discussion of medieval Aristotelian views on habits current before Aristotle's ethical works themselves were available, see C. Nederman, "Nature, Ethics, and the Doctrine of 'Habitus': Aristotelian Moral Psychology in the Twelfth Century," Traditio 45 (1989-90): 87110 ; and M. Colish, "Habitus Revised: A Reply to Cary Nederman," Traditio 48 (1993): 77-92. I 191 192 leo M MEN TAR Y not naturally by training but supernaturally by grace; they reserve the term 'character' for indelible, supernaturally infused habits. Aquinas refers to the characters ofbaptism, confirmation, and ordination. Nonetheless, the resemblances between medieval Scholastics and Aristotle are more important than the differences . Like Aristotle, medieval Aristotelians emphasize the role of stable states (habits) of the soul in understanding moral questions. And what we call character is the product of habits in their view. Talk of habits and acts is just as relevant to the theoretical as to the practical realm of morals. Knowledge, doubt, and opinion are habits ofthe soul in just the same way as moral and theological virtues-such as justice and charity. For this reason, when discussing habits and acts generally, arguments about cognitive habits and acts are just as appropriate as arguments about appetitive habits and acts. Indeed, Ockham more frequently uses cognitive than appetitive habits as examples. To a person accustomed to modern psychological theory, the terminology ofAristotelian habit-based moral theory may sound arcane, but in fact commonsense moral discourse frequently assumes the existence of virtuous dispositions-that is, Aristotelian habits. When we speak of an honest person, we are not referring simply to a person who has acted honestly at least once in the past; we are also expressing a beliefthat that person has a propensity to honest actions and can be expected to continue acting honestly in the future. Virtues are not mere behavioral tropisms , either. They involve judgment and considered values, and they are produced in certain characteristic ways. We presume that honesty is ordinarily the result of training and part of an established pattern of behavior, a disposition that will normally reveal itself in the appropriate circumstances.2 Ifwe are to consider the virtues ofprudence, courage,justice, and temperance in terms of habits, we must establish what kind of habit we are dealing with and what makes one habit different from another. Since this is a treatise about the connection of the virtues, Ockham also has to consider whether and how the possession and practice of one virtue strengthens another. He assumes that his readers will agree that prudence is an intellectual virtue produced by the exercise of right reason, while justice, courage, and temperance are volitional, moral virtues. 2. A good discussion of the Aristotelian theory of habits is provided in Myles Burnyeat's "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1980),69-92. 193 I On Medieval Psychology Ockham's initial conclusion is that moral virtues are independent at the level of ordinary virtue. Ordinary justice and temperance are essentially distinct and unrelated virtues, not produced by specifically the same acts. Also...