Ockham on the Virtues

Art. I

I Utrum virtutes sint connexae [Art. I: Conclusiones ad propositum necessariaeJ Circa istam quaestionem1 sunt quattuor facienda: p rim 0, praemittendae sunt aliquae conclusiones necessariae ad propositum ; sec u n d 0, aliquae distinctiones; t e r t i 0, respon- 5 dendum est ad quaestionem; qua r t 0, movenda sunt aliqua dubia, et solvenda. [Conclusio prima] Quantum ad primum est prima conclusio,2 quod quanta est distinctio habituum tanta est actuum, ita quod aequalis est. Hoc 10 probatur primo, quia omnia individua aeque perfecta inclinativa, sive elicitiva sive receptiva, si sint eiusdem rationis, possunt in effectus eiusdem rationis, et si non possunt in effectus eiusdem rationis, ilia principia non sunt eiusdem rationis; sed habitus generati ex actibus sunt effectus illorum, sicut alibi patet in tertio 15 1. On the history of the question of whether the virtues are connected , see chapter 4 above. a. In this translation, the paragraphs are numbered according to the line numbers with which the paragraphs begin in the critical edition. Apart from a few notes by the translator, most of the notes appear only on the facing page with the Latin text. The Latin notes are taken for the most part from the critical edition and have been slightly revised, chiefly by changing their form not their content. 2. Cf. OTh VI, 402-4; OTh I, -213-20. I 62 63 I Article I I On the Connection of the Virtues [Art. 1: Prefatory Conclusions] 3. Concerning this question,l there are four things we should do. First, we should preface the discussion with some conclusions necessary to the question being considered; second, we should make some distinctions. Third, we should reply to the question. Fourth, we should state and resolve some doubts.a [First Conclusion] 9. As to the first article, the first conclusion2 is that the distinction between habits is as great as the distinction between acts. That the distinction is equal is proved, first because all equally perfect individual things of the same kind-whether inclinative, elicitive, or receptive - are capable of producing effects of the same kind; ifthey are not capable of effects ofthe same kind, they are not principles of the same kind. But habits generated by acts are effects produced by those acts, as is evident elsewhere-in 64 I T EXT o c k h a m,3 et non semper sunt eiusdem speciei nec esse possunt , sicut patet de habitu respectu incomplexi et complexi, de habitu respectu principii et conclusionis; igitur nec actus generativi istorum. Praeterea si actus distinctorum obiectorum specie non distin- 20 guerentur specie, hoc non esset nisi qui a causae4 distinctae specie possunt in eundem effectum specie, et ideo non obstante quod habitus, qui sunt causa actuum, distinguuntur specie, tamen ipsi actus possunt esse eiusdem speciei; vel propter ordinem obiectorum,5 sicut est de principio et conclusione, respectu quorum 25 possunt esse actus eiusdem speciei propter ordinem eorum. Sed primum6 non impedit, quia si sic, cum actus sint causa habituum sicut e converso, numquam erit via ad probandum distinctionem specificam inter aliquos habitus, quia per te causae distinctae specie etc.; igitur quantumcumque ponatur distinctio specifica in acti- 30 bus, numquam ponetur propter hoc quod erit in habitibus, quod falsum est. Nec secundum7 impedit, quia habitus principiorum non possunt generari ex actibus conclusionum nec ad tales actus inclinare ; sed si actus principiorum et conclusionum essent eiusdem speciei, possent habitus istorum ad tales actus inclinare; ergo ordo 35 obiectorum non impedit distinctionem specificam actuum. Praeterea, II Ethicorum,8 habitus ex eisdem generantur et augmentantur ; sed actus, per quos habitus distinctarum specierum augmentantur, sunt alterius speciei; igitur et actus ex quibus generantur . 40 Praeterea [probatur] per idem argumentum per quod I 0ann e s probat in Metaphysica9 distinctionem specificam inter habitum principii et conclusionis: quia scilicet aliquis potest habitualiter scire principium et errare circa conclusionem, sed idem b. Here the reporter responsible for the written text has recorded Ockham's reference to his own works in the third person. It is not a sign that we should question the authenticity ofDe connexione, but that we have a reportatio, not a written version approved by Ockham. See the preface above. 3. Cf. OTh VI, 397-98; OTh VI, 205. 4. Cf. OTh I, 95. . 5. Cf. OTh V, 393. 6. See lines 21-22. 7. See lines 24-25. 8. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 2.2.1105a13-15; OTh VI, 392. 9. cr. Scotus...