Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition

1. Logical Atomism

CHAPTERI O N E Logical Atomism To understand Wittgenstein's early philosophy, we must begin with the problem of language. Wittgenstein's Tractatus seeks to explicate the conditions by which it is possible for language to have meaning. When language expresses an idea, typically in formulating a proposition to convey a thought, it can be used to say something that is definitely true or definitely false. The Tractatus offers a philosophical semantics to explain how this can be so, taking as its general topic the question of how meaning is achieved in any logically possible language under any logically possible circumstances. The account Wittgenstein presents has three main parts. It combines a metaphysics of logical atomism with a picture theory of meaning and a definition of the general form of proposition. The idea oflogical atomism can best be understood in terms of an analogy with physical atomism. Physical atomism is the building up of material objects by combinations of atoms into molecules, and molecules into macrophysical things like tables and chairs and solar systems, the sum total ofwhich constitute the furniture of the universe. Wittgenstein's semantics is committed to a logical rather than physical atomism, and we must see in what respects logical atomism is like and in what respects it is unlike physical atomism. Any particular use of language, such as the disturbance of air produced when someone speaks or the marks made on paper in writing and printing, is a concrete expression of thought. Regarding its concrete expressions only as such, language is not only analogous to but is itself a material entity consisting of physical molecules of graphite, ink, or air in motion, which in turn are composed of physical atoms. Logical atomism as distinct I 17 18 I C HAP T E RON E from purely physical atomism in Wittgenstein's sense requires that we think of language in more abstract terms. Language on this conception is like any material object, in that it involves simple units of meaning put together in complex ways. The book you are now reading is a meaningful expression of thoughts that can be understood and communicated in language from mind to mind. A book consists of individual chapters in a certain order; the chapters consist ofindividual sections and paragraphs, again in a certain order; the paragraphs consist ofindividual sentences; the sentences consist of individual words; and the words consist of individual letters of the alphabet. The idea of interpreting the meaning of complex linguistic expressions as a semantic function of the meaning of simpler meaningful units was already known in ancient Greek philosophy .I Among more recent thinkers the concept is perhaps most often associated with Frege's theory of language. Frege is understood by Wittgenstein to accept such a principle, for example, when he writes in the Tractatus 3.318: "I conceive the proposition -like Frege and Russell- as a function of the expressions contained in it."2 It was Russell who coined the term 'logical atomism ', and Wittgenstein later reports that he adopted the term 'atomic proposition' from Russell's 1917-18 "Lectures on Logical Atomism."3 Yet the doctrine of logical atomism in Russell's or Wittgenstein's philosophy requires more than the thesis that larger meaningful expressions in a language can be built up out of smaller meaningful expressions. What is needed for logical atomism is the further thesis that there are ultimately simple or irreducible semantic units of meaning. These will be genuine logical atoms that, like genuine physical atoms, cannot be subdivided into more basic constituents. Otherwise, there is no reason to suppose that the decomposition of meaning could not continue indefinitely. Logical atoms, if there are any, must provide the absolutely fundamental starting place for the constructive elaboration of meaning, the semantic building blocks of all language. Wittgenstein proposes to explain language in its most abstract general terms. He must therefore identify the logically most basic elements in the analysis of meaning for any logically possible language, including natural languages like English, French, German, Russian, Japanese, and special mathematical and scientific languages. Since Wittgenstein's goal is to find whatever it is that makes any language work-that by virtue of which any conceivable language is capable ofexpressing determinate meaning-it will not do for him to settle on the words or sentences orany particular language as its logical atoms. That there 19 I Logical Atomism··'~·" must be logical atoms...