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18 The Holocaust as a Paradigm for Ethical Thinking and Representation Tamás Kisantal Representations of the Holocaust in literature raise some problems that do not emerge when dealing with other historical events—at least not so obviously. On the one hand, we are faced with problems of methods and the cultural consequences of historical representation; on the other hand, there are questions related to certain claims made by scholars of contemporary philosophy of history, asserting the relative character of historical representation. According to this relativist perspective —expressed most clearly in Hayden White's "metahistory"—any kind of historical narrative is legitimate, or more precisely, there is no external viewpoint from which any of these narratives would seem more suitable than the others. The critics of the new (or postmodern) philosophy of history refer, usually, to the Holocaust as a counter-example, a case when ethics and political attitude (beside points of reference to "reality") could also define the legitimacy of representation. In other words, the so-called postmodernist attitude of "anything goes" cannot work when it comes to the representation of the Holocaust because there are ethical, cultural, and referential rules that determine the methods of (historical) representation. This point of view is expressed when it is argued that "the killing of the Jews seemed to show that absolute moral standards were necessary, that cultural relativism had reached its limits in the death camps" (Appleby, Hunt, Jacob 7). As Michael Dintenfass suggests in his essay on theoretical debates about the Holocaust, this event has become the touchstone of contemporary metahistorical disputes. On the one hand, opponents of the linguistic turn point out that relativist theorists make the denial of Holocaust possible, and that such theorists must give up their relativist position because of the threat that ultraright opinions present. Consequently, if the relativistic theory does not work in this case, we can question the adequacy of the entire perspective. On the other hand, the case of the Holocaust has become important for representatives of the new philoso- The Holocaust as a Paradigm for Ethical Thinking and Representation 19 phy of history such as Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra, since they either try to defend and revise their theories or demonstrate the applicability of relativism to all historical events including the Holocaust (see, e.g., Dintenfass). For example, White called his point of view as a "relatively relativistic" stand and suggested that the Holocaust and some other events of the twentieth century—modernist events, as he called them—were different than other historical events because ethics plays a much more important role in our cultural attitude to events of the former kind. Nevertheless, problems arise, not only regarding the methods and cultural consequences of the historical accounts of the Holocaust, but also—maybe even more seriously—concerning the possibilities of artistic representation. All aspects of the representation of the Holocaust have been subject to many debates—the representability of the event, the problem of the authenticity of the artistic representation, the question of the genres and artistic forms that are adequate for the representation, and so on, and some of the most extreme viewpoints cast doubt even on the adequacy and legitimacy of literary discourse in the case of the Holocaust. Usually, the question of representability is bound up with the "uniqueness" of the event: according to this view, the Holocaust is a kind of event that "sticks out" in history, it is beyond all human experiences, and incomparable with any other historical events; therefore, no one is able to produce an authentic representation of it. This extra-historicity is connected with the inexplicableness of the event: the ordinary events of human history can be explained using rational argumentation, but in the case of the Holocaust all general explications fail, because this event cannot be grasped by human understanding. Consequently, the Holocaust is essentially different from any other historical events; it is unexplainable because the extension and dreadfulness of the Holocaust are beyond human reason. We can refer to statements that have often been cited, for example, George Steiner's, "The world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it lies outside reason," or Elie Wiesel's, "We shall never understand how Auschwitz was possible" (qtd. in White 79, 190). Dan Stone asserts that the Holocaust constitutes a black hole in our understanding of historical time and suggests initiating a new chronology in which the starting point would be the Final Solution (262). But other philosophers and historians point to the...

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