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4 Planning for the Unthinkable: Countering a North Korean Nuclear Attack and Management of Postattack Scenarios
- University of Nebraska Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
89 orth Korea’s nuclear program first came to the forefront as a threat to world and regional security in 1994, when former American president Jimmy Carter was able to bring Pyongyang back from the brink and helped to negotiate what would later become known as the Agreed Framework. Since that time, North Korea has been engaged in on-again, off-again talks with the United States and other key players in the region; used numerous acts of brinkmanship with its nuclear program; and conducted its first two underground nuclear tests in 2006 and 2010.2 The international community’s frustration concerning North Korea’s many acts of brinkmanship with its nuclear program over a period of nearly twenty years—and the corresponding geopolitical discussions that then ensue— tends to take away from the reasons that the program is such a concern for the international community. The unthinkable and seldom-discussed threat of a nuclear attack is a nightmare scenario not only for the region but also for all nation-states that have an interest there. North Korea shows no realistic signs of giving up its nuclear program any time in the foreseeable future. As Brookings Institution senior scholar Richard Bush writes, “This is because a DPRK willingness to pursue the bargain proffered in the 6PT [six party talks] would force the regime to make fundamental and unpalatable choices about how to ensure its survival and ensure the security of the state.”3 Following the North Korean attack on the Cheonan on March 26, 2010, the South Korean and U.S. militaries showed solidarity in deterring Pyongyang’s many potential threats. 4 PLANNING FOR THE UNTHINKABLE Countering a North Korean Nuclear Attack and Management of Postattack Scenarios1 N Washington and Seoul, as discussed in chapter 3, conducted several maritime exercises aimed directly at deterring and containing North Korea’s military capabilities and its ability to proliferate WMD. In response to at least one of these exercises, North Korea threatened to continue with a “strong deterrent,” a term Pyongyang has often used to refer to its nuclear program.4 Pyongyang also claimed in the summer of 2010 that it had developed improved nuclear weaponization technology, perhaps giving it the ability to put warheads on ballistic missiles.5 In its 2009–2010 report assessing nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, the Arms Control Association gave North Korea the grade of F, or the lowest possible rating.6 All of these developments occurred during increased tensions in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula during 2009–2010, and U.S.ROK alliance cooperation was as strong and cooperative as it had ever been. The fear of instability in an already unpredictable nation-state armed with nuclear weapons was exacerbated in late December 2011 when Kim Jongil died. Thus, North Korea’s capability to conduct a nuclear attack and the ability of nations with interests in the region—particularly the United States, South Korea, and Japan—to counter this threat have become paramount concerns. This chapter will outline how the U.S.-ROK alliance should prepare countermeasures in the case of a North Korean nuclear attack on either South Korea or another key location (likely Japan). First, it will first be important to describe North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, including the type and number of possible weapons that it could use in a nuclear attack and the ones under development. I then will examine the various types of attack scenarios that the North Koreans could use to implement a nuclear attack. Because a nuclear attack would create such horror and destruction—no matter how or where it occurred—I will address the viability of a preemptive strike by U.S. or South Korean forces, how it would or could occur, how effective it would be, and what the likely reaction from North Korea would be. In considering a possible nuclear attack, understanding what kind of damage it would cause is important. Thus, I will analyze the expected damage from a nuclear attack, the military countermeasures that could be taken, and how consequence management might work. I will also make a judgment on the U.S.-ROK alliance’s current military readiness to 90 The Last Days of Kim Jong-il [3.80.173.25] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 07:11 GMT) deter and defend against a North Korean nuclear attack. I will conclude this chapter with some implications for the future. Many questions about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities remain despite the many reports, announcements...