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11 orth Korea was a constant source of news from 2009 through 2011 and into 2012 after the death of the Dear Leader. Kim Jong-il’s health issues in 2009 led to a plethora of pondering press pieces all over East Asia and in the United States. Indeed, questions about how long the Dear Leader would continue to live also led to international curiosity about the regime succession process in North Korea and about the apparent plans for Kim to be succeeded by his third and youngest son, Kim Chong-un. But while these questions caught the fancy of the international press and of scholars who focus on East Asian issues, the issues that truly made North Korea a constant and focused source of news and concern for not only East Asia but also the rest of the world were associated with Pyongyang’s violent military provocations against its neighbor to the south. Twice in 2010 North Korea’s unprovoked acts of military violence against South Korea not only brought the Korean Peninsula into the headlines all over the world but also raised concerns over both the capabilities of the North Korean military and the strategy that Pyongyang uses and plans to use for its very large—the world’s fifth largest—and often unpredictable military.1 North Korea’s aggressive use of violent military force raises many national security questions and not the least of which is, how has North Korea’s strategy for using its military forces changed in recent years? It is my belief, based on the evidence, that North Korea and its large army are facing various sustainment and modernization issues. Indeed, I would also assess that the North Korean military faces morale and welfare issues that 2 MAINTAINING A ROGUE MILITARY North Korea’s Military Capabilities and Strategy at the End of the Kim Jong-il Era and South Korea’s Ability to Counter the DPRK Threat N continue to have an impact on its readiness to conduct warfare. But this chapter addresses exactly how the military—which in North Korea operates in more of a state of flux than most people realize—has adjusted to these issues. North Korea has gradually but quite clearly changed the focus of its forces to meet the challenges of sustainment, aging equipment, and a prosperous , militarily well-equipped neighbor to the south. Along those lines, I examine recent (since the mid-2000s) advances North Korea has been able to initiate in its military forces that directly threaten the U.S.-ROK alliance and the alliance’s ability to defend the South Korean landmass. Because the succession process has played such a major role in the North Korean governmental infrastructure and because the government’s power structure is so tied into the military in North Korea, I review the often unpredictable and highly unusual process of the planned handover of power from father to third son in Pyongyang and how it will affect military readiness and the stability of the military command structure now that Kim Jong-il is dead. Finally, I will show how the South Korean military and its American allies have reacted to and planned for changes occurring in the North Korean military and government. Issues Facing the North Korean People’s Army Always in the background of any discussion about the readiness and capabilities of the North Korean military are serious questions about North Korea’s long-standing economic problems, and East Asian analysts often cite them as a reason why the army would not be able to fight effectively in a war with South Korea.2 The North Korean military has not been able to add as many upgrades to its forces as Pyongyang would prefer, and this situation has existed since 1990, when the Soviet Union cut off subsidies of military equipment and fuel.3 North Korea is struggling to feed its people and simply provide fuel and power nationwide, and it is against this backdrop that the issues for the North Korean military should be addressed. The military is the best-fed, most efficient institution in North Korea, but in recent years, reports have begun to seep out about morale, efficiency, and readiness issues in some military units. According to a Chinese source that visited North Korea and 12 The Last Days of Kim Jong-il [18.191.174.168] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 17:25 GMT) reported to the South Korean press in early 2011, a new issue that...

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