In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

[4] FATWA In May 1996, Osama left Sudan, returning to Afghanistan. The circumstances surrounding his departure remain murky, but he was evidently embittered to have, once again, been exiled, and he suspected that Sudan had succumbed to U.S. pressure. The ruling NIF was anxious to rehabilitate its deplorable image with the West, and the State Department had noted bin Laden’s presence among the reasons for designating it a state sponsor of terrorism. As an impediment to normal diplomatic and economic relations, the designation was not without tangible cost. Generally, it made Sudan a pariah among nations. In August 1994, the NIF turned the notorious terrorist Carlos the Jackal, to whom it had offered sanctuary since 1991, over to France to stand trial for the murder of two French police officers and an informant. Though Carlos had long outlived his usefulness to anyone, his extradition was a major symbolic initiative. An enduring rumor is that Hassan al-Turabi, Sudan’s de facto ruler, had offered to turn bin Laden over to American custody sometime in 1995. Richard Clarke denies this unequivocally: “The facts about the supposed Sudanese offer to give us bin Laden are that Turabi was not about to turn over his partner in terror to us and no real attempt to do so ever occurred.”1 The 9/11 Commission investigated and concluded there was no substance to the myth and, furthermore, the United States “had no legal basis . . . since, at the time, there was no indictment outstanding.”2 This is a critical factor: that without an indictment, there existed no grounds for detaining bin Laden simply on the basis of a suspected or professed threat. Above and beyond whatever influence the United States may have exerted, the NIF was increasingly wary over Osama’s growing assertiveness. John Prendergast, a former National Security Council official, was told by “a Sudanese who could only be identified as a Khartoum ‘legal expert’” that “bin Laden was forced out because the Khartoum government felt he was becoming too powerful. With increasing influence over the Sudanese economy and a small private army at his disposal, bin Laden was determined to have his way. . . . ‘Turabi wanted to guide 32 Al Qaeda Declares War and control bin Laden and other extremist elements. But bin Laden wanted to guide the Sudanese government, like he did the Taliban.’”3 Osama was linked to at least two terror plots during his time in Sudan. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside a facility in Riyadh where the United States trained members of the Saudi National Guard, killing five Americans and two Indians. The Saudis arrested four suspects who supposedly confessed. They were quickly executed before American officials ever had the opportunity to question them. They allegedly claimed to have been inspired by bin Laden. U.S. intelligence later learned that al Qaeda had shipped explosives to Saudi Arabia for use against American targets.4 Perhaps even more disturbing to the NIF was an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was on a visit to Addis Ababa in 1995. He only narrowly escaped with his life. Another attack immediately followed Osama’s return to Afghanistan. In June 1996, a truck bomb exploded at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where U.S. Air Force personnel were housed. Nineteen Americans were killed and more than three hundred and seventy wounded. Hezbollah, a terrorist group with ties to Iran, has been held responsible, but the 9/11 Commission found, “there are also signs that al Qaeda played some role, as yet unknown.”5 The expulsion from Sudan cost bin Laden dearly. When he left, he supposedly lost investments worth as much as $150 million.6 Prior to returning to Afghanistan, al Qaeda “had concentrated on providing funds, training, and weapons for actions carried out by members of allied groups. The attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa in the summer of 1998 would take a different form—planned, directed, and executed by al Qaeda, under the direct supervision of Bin Ladin and his chief aides.”7 --On August 23, 1996, bin Laden declared war against the United States. The grandiosely titled “Message from Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel the Heretics from the Arabian Peninsula” was published in the London-based Arabic language newspaper...

Share