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Conclusion
- Brandeis University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
155 CONCLUSION T his book has endeavored to shed new light on the fate of Chinese religions during the fifty years extending from the antireligion policies enacted during the 1898 reforms to the devastation wrought on Chinese religious life by years of natural disasters, warfare, and civil strife culminating in the ccP’s rule over China. Its main agenda has been to comprehend more fully how the Chinese religious traditions and the diverse resources associated with their practice either survived or ended up being reconfigured during this critical era. In chapter 1, we considered how communal religious traditions were affected by a range of campaigns launched against temples and festivals. Chapter 2 examined how new printing technologies sparked the growth of religious publishing enterprises that contributed to the spread of innovative forms of knowledge, while chapter 3 portrayed the ways in which religiosity shaped the lives of modern Chinese elites. Based on the data presented in these chapters, it would seem that communal religious traditions experienced processes of adaptation and negotiation, while religious publishing witnessed both adaptation and innovation , and elite religiosity negotiation and innovation. In the pages that follow, I will assess how the phenomena discussed in these chapters continue to influence Chinese religious life today. In the case of modern Taiwan, some scholars maintain that state-society interactions have contributed to the formation of a “civil religion” that has links to Western ideas of modern democracy without 156 Religion in China and its ModeRn Fate conforming fully to secularization models. As in the West, religious affiliation does seem to have some impact on political behavior , with believers who identify themselves as Presbyterians, Dharma Drum Mountain (Fagushan 法鼓山) Buddhists, Daoists, and members of redemptive societies such as the Way of Pervading Unity (Yiguandao) tending to be more pan-Green, while other Christians and members of the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation (Ciji gongdehui 慈濟功德會) seem more likely to be pan-Blue.1 The interplay between religion and the state continues in China as well, albeit with some new wrinkles. Chinese temple cults and the ritual events they organize flourish as hotbeds of cultural innovation and negotiation, with local elites working to expand the space for religious activities while also legitimizing them.2 China also is experiencing a “Confucian revival,” especially in the realm of ritual,3 and the authorities even have been exploring the possibility of allowing the legalization of the Yiguandao, partly because its popularity and emphasis on Chinese values might serve as a counterweight to the rise of Christianity, particularly in the form of Protestant underground churches.4 Christianity itself remains a cause for state concern because of the power that outside forces such as the Vatican exert on Chinese Catholics and because of the mixed results of state attempts to regulate Protestant pastors in the Three Self Patriotic Movement (tsPM; Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi aiguo yundong 中國基督教三自愛國運動), which have ended up inadvertently benefiting underground churches. The growth of Chinese Christianity also is being molded by indigenous Protestant groups, a trend that merits further comparison to the history of Taiwanese Christianity during the postwar era.5 Other contemporary catalysts for change come in the form of tourism and new categories such as intangible cultural heritage . Recent research has identified tourism as a crucial arena for understanding state attempts to effectively manage and standardize the local forces shaping China’s religious revival, particu- [3.88.254.50] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 15:54 GMT) 157 ConClusion larly in terms of promoting religious tourism as a healthy form of consumption that can contribute to exemplary modern behavior and nationalist sentiments, as well as the various forms of resistance that such projects encounter. Another central theme is the impact of tourism on non-Han communities, with state attempts to reframe sacred sites as tourist centers providing local authorities with opportunities to transform beliefs and practices formerly labeled as “superstition” (mixin 迷信) into “customs” ( fengsu 風俗) or “intangible cultural heritage” ( fei wuzhi wenhua yichan 非物質文化遺產) that possess intrinsic value.6 Overall, the data coming out of China make it clear that modernization has not led to the decline of religiosity, which is in fact booming.7 Now we are witnessing a religious revival in China, but it is an odd revival indeed because of the lack of direct state participation . As we saw in chapter 1, throughout the imperial era the legitimacy of the Chinese state depended in part on its ability both to control and to practice religion. Many forms of religious practice featured active...