The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony: America’s War of Liberation in Canada, 1774–1776

12 | Time to Consider Politics: The Continental Congress, the Northern Army, and a Committee for Canada

Chapter 12 Time to Consider Politics The Continental Congress, the Northern Army, and a Committee for Canada If We should be successful in that Province, a momentous, political Question arises. What is to be done with it? | John Adams to Joseph Warren, Philadelphia, 8 October 1775 I am entirely of your Opinion that We shall be undone unless the most spirited Measures are pursued. | Rhode Island Delegate Samuel Ward to Henry Ward, 8 January 1776 Even before the fall of Fort Chambly, New Hampshire delegates believed: “We are likely soon to be in possession of St. John’s [St-Jean] and Canada,” and John Adams noted the “very promising Intelligence concerning the operations of the Northern Army.” It was easy to forget that many measures were needed to ensure military and political success,and especially to defend Quebec once liberated.General Schuyler did all he could to remind Congress that the army needed strategic guidance,reinforcements,money,supplies,and support with Canadian politics. Congress, however, was distracted by more immediate,persistent,and louder demands: the siege of Boston,governance in the absence of Royal authorities,defiant New York loyalists,a continent-wide gunpowder shortage, finances—the list was almost endless; and Canada seemed to be progressing so well.1 On 9 October,when Congress read General Schuyler’s letters of 19 and 29 September, it spurred an initial round of discussions about long-term plans for Canada. In the first letter (described in Chapter Eight), reporting early struggles around Fort St-Jean, the general asked important strategic questions about Canadian politics and the Northern Army’s future. The second Time to Consider Politics 171 emphasized Montgomery’s request for a committee to help establish a free Canadian government. John Adams,perhaps after previewing Schuyler’s letters,was already pondering such issues. He saw that a new Quebec government was necessary, but asked what form it should take: “Shall the Canadians choose an House of Representatives, a Council and a Governor?”Adams made it clear that “It will not do to govern them by Martial Law, and make our General Governor ,” replacing one form of oppression with another. But, there was always a lurking, fundamental question—“Is there Knowledge and Understanding enough among them [the Canadians], to elect an assembly, which will be capable of ruling them and then to be governed by it?”2 Congress considered Schuyler’s letters for a few days,before President John Hancock responded on 11 October.In Hancock’s words,the United Colonies’ primary objective was to induce the Canadians “to accede to an Union with these Colonies, and that they form from the several Parishes a Provincial Convention and send Delegates to this Congress.” They recommended a Georgia-style approach: “in the present unsettled State of that Country, a regular Election can hardly be expected, we must acquiesce in the Choice of such Parishes and Districts as are disposed to join us.”This model had been proven successful over the summer,when a proper Georgian provincial delegation joined the St. John’s Parish representatives, officially adding the thirteenth colony to the Continental confederation.While Congress agreed upon “the Necessity of attending to the Situation of Canada,”the body trusted that Schuyler’s “Care and Prudence” would render any Congressional delegation “unnecessary, at least for the present.”3 Also, while Congress could have tackled the issue of Northern Army replacement units directly, they deferred to Schuyler. After requesting the commander’s assessment of troop needs, Hancock also asked him to suggest “the best Method of procuring men,” a decision that clearly belonged in Philadelphia or colonial capitals.By passing these issues to Schuyler’s hands, Congress delayed resolution,effectively ensuring a significant gap in Northern Army troop strength over the winter; and this was being done before Fort Chambly had even fallen.4 General Schuyler was distinctly displeased with Congress’s response,which he received around 20 October.The Northern Army commander immediately and frankly replied that Congress was “not in Sentiment” with him on the 172 The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony subject of a committee. Schuyler explained that a delegation was an absolute necessity. In an ideal army, “in which discipline and subordination are established, and prevail,”a general might handle such political tasks, but the Northern Army was clearly not in that situation. Both he and Montgomery were overwhelmed with martial demands, and they simply could not spend adequate time...