The Cultural Economy of Falun Gong in China: A Rhetorical Perspective

One: The Rise of Falun Gong

ONE The Rise of Falun Gong SINCE ITS INCEPTION in 1992, Falun Gong has attracted a large number of Chinese followers. At its height, from 1996 to April 1999, it claimed to have a membership of between 70 million and 100 million practitioners.1 Members of Falun Gong come from all walks of life: college students, scholars, workers, merchants, and peasants. Perhaps the most interesting among these groups, however, are the roughly two hundred thousand members who also belong to the Chinese Communist Party; they range from senior party officials and eminent party leaders who once participated in the Long March to rank and filers such as party secretaries, model workers, and war heroes.2 These so-called Old Revolutionaries (lao geming), many of whom became Falun Gong spokespersons, have aroused public interest and warranted scholarly attention. Most pledged their allegiance to the Communist cause at a young age and fought for the Chinese Communist Revolution for most of their lives. Yet, when a heterodox folk religion arose, they seemingly switched their loyalty and devoted themselves to Falun Gong. Li Hongzhi founded Falun Gong in 1992. He began to lecture and set up teaching stations in northeastern China. Similar to other practitioners of qigong (various Chinese systems of physical and mental training for health and self-enlightenment), Falun Gong enthusiasts initially expressed an interest in healing. Between 1992 and 1995, Li popularized Falun Gong by giving talks, publishing lectures, and selling books and other paraphernalia, building a nationwide organization. Falun Gong’s main ideology focus was on freedom of speech and religion, as well as the fight for human rights.3 At the onset Falun Gong insisted that it did not have a political agenda; its main goal was to cultivate moral elevation. However, a political overtone was apparent in the organization’s actions. Observers noted similarities between Falun Gong and secret societies and millenarian sects in China’s past, such as White Lotus. Earlier sect leaders denounced the corruption of the regime while espousing their own utopia as an alternative. In the case of Falun Gong, Li Hongzhi’s writings are highly sectarian, as he understands himself and Falun Gong in terms of a centuries-old cultural tradition.4 The Chinese leadership in the imperial period inevitably responded with crackdowns to maintain
The Rise of Falun Gong 9 social order. The contemporary anticult campaign to eradicate the influence of Falun Gong resonates with this history, in which the state declared certain masters, healing forms, and spiritual practices to be false, superstitious, and evil. Boundaries were created.5 The government views Falun Gong differently from the way it is perceived by the organization’s members. While Chinese authorities have insisted that Falun Gong is a tightly structured, well-organized, and purposeful group that is capable of achieving a variety of goals, Falun Gong has emphasized its supposedly decentralized and voluntary character. Li left China in early 1995 in response to mounting opposition within some party and government circles. Hoping to provide some sort of organizational base for Falun Gong, Li’s assistants in Beijing applied for registration as a “social organization ,” first to the National Minority Affairs Commission, then to the Chinese Buddhist Federation, and finally to the United Front Department. All applications were denied.6 Instead the government created even more restrictions on Falun Gong and declared it an illegal organization on July 22, 1999. Falun Gong is one of the largest nongovernmental organizations in the history of the People’s Republic of China. Economic reforms and the turn to a market economy created the space for Falun Gong to exist, but the continued political dominance of an authoritarian regime and communist ideology led to its suppression. The introduction of economic reforms in 1978 was greeted by praise within China and from many in the West. The reforms were seen as an opportunity for China to walk away from communism and join the ranks of other modernized countries. The reforms were also perceived as steppingstones for China to achieve Western-style liberal democracy. As with any sweeping change, however, the economic reforms brought both successes and failures. While some Chinese experienced a significant rise in their living standards, others fell through the cracks. A few Chinese theorists and academicians have come to call these marginalized individuals the “Socially Vulnerable Group” (ruoshi qunti). According to Zan Jiansen, a professor of political science at Shanxi University, the Socially Vulnerable Group consists of those whose income, social status, civil...