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Chapter 5 Aristotle's Reception of the Sophists Aristotle's reception of the sophists resembles, in some respects, those of Plato and !socrates; yet, it differs sufficiently from theirs to merit a separate treatment.1 For the most part, the Aristotelian reception revolves around the axis of the critical attitude carved out by Plato and, to a lesser extent, !socrates. That it should do so is hardly surprising given that Aristotle shared with his teacher (Plato) on the one hand and his pedagogical rival (!socrates) on the other a common set of cultural realities and a similar sociopolitical horizon; and it is hardly surprising in the light of his lengthy studies in Plato's Academy as well as his familiarity with !socrates' rhetorical compositions. But Aristotle had a mind of his own, a mind devoted neither to the articulation of universal forms nor to the expression of pan-Hellenic manifestos, but rather to the compilation and structuration of what was known in several areas of inquiry during his time.2 In contrast to the Platonic and Isocratean receptions, which evaluated the sophists' notions and practices by the criteria of abiding truth and situated usefulness respectively, the Aristotelian relies more heavily on the standards of historical significance and logical correctness. Along with Aristotle's conceptualization of rhetoric as a distinct field of study (an art with its own rules and principles), the application of these two standards led to the following reception: because they contributed to the cultural reservoir of rhetorical insights, the sophists are historically important; but because their reasoning was often flawed, it needs to be corrected. This twofold assessment rests on Aristotle's view that all discoveries are the result of either elaborations on previously worked matters or original inventions (Sophistical Refutations, 183b.l7-20). By his own admission, a good part of his Rhetoric constitutes an elaboration of 150 Aristotle's Reception of the Sophists 151 prior insights: "on the subject of rhetoric there already existed much material enunciated in the past" (Sophistical Refutations, 184a.1084b .l). On the other hand, his Topics stands as an original invention: "regarding reasoning (1JvaJ.Levwv): we have derived certain views from some of them, and they in turn are indebted to others. (Metaphysics, 993b.l2-19) Part of Aristotle's attitude toward the sophists can be discerned by two simple and warranted changes in this passage: first, substituting "those who have theorized about reality" with "those who have done work in rhetoric," and second, extending the logic of the PhrynisTimotheus relation to read as follows: "If there had been no sophists, we should not possess much of our rhetoric; and if there had been no sophists, there would have been no Aristotle." Inasmuch, ·then, as the sophists were among the earliest pra~titioners and teachers of rhetoric, their initial observations are credited with having influenced the thinking of their successors, including that of Aristotle. But what sounds historically worthwhile to Aristotle the overviewer of the early days of rhetoric appears inferior to Aristotle the critic of discourse . Interestingly, what makes the sophists' views worthy and inferior at the same time is the same thing: their preliminariness. Preliminary discoveries, for Aristotle, are almost inherently tentative, incomplete, and inadequate. By contrast, subsequent ones (e.g., Aristotle 's own) are more definitive, more complete, and more adequate . This is the Aristotelian system of development at work: successors generally outshine, outperform, and outdo their predecessors ; or, the closer an idea or a practice is to its end, its telos, the better Aristotle's Reception of the Sophists 159 it is. Hence the general tendency of many traditional historians of rhetoric to regard Aristotle's Rhetoric as a refinement of previous versions of the art. Beyond Aristotle's expressed gratitude to sophistical rhetoric, there lies the distant and impersonal discourse of a seemingly objective historian intent on describing the thinking and practices of the sophists. This discourse is complemented by that of a scientist (really, a knower) whose novel discoveries are invoked so as to straighten out the warped rules of the sophists' operations and to affirm the priority of the real over the apparent. In the Rhetoric, for example, Aristotle points out that the sophists had perverted the art of persuasion by relying tOO much on its inessential features (1TpO!l-a) of persuasion (Rhetoric, 1.1.3). Further, they did not approach rhetoric methodically, that is, as an art with its own principles and rules. Because their main interest lay in practical matters...

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