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Chapter Four THE BRITISH ON THE SEA ISLANDS Sir Henry Clinton’s decision to disembark in the North Edisto River ensured that the navy would have a sheltered anchorage and the troops would get ashore unopposed, but the landing on Simmons Island left his army twenty miles from Charleston. The nature of the lowcountry terrain, laced with rivers, creeks, marsh, and swamps, heralded a difficult journey for the British. Still, their advance could not be hindered enough for Lincoln and the Americans. Lacking sufficient troops to oppose the British army west of the Ashley, Lincoln’s forces could harass the British as they pushed forward but could not stop them. This circumstance was to have unfortunate results for inhabitants south and west of the city. Although Sir Henry Clinton and his army were free of the transports , their ultimate success remained inextricably linked to that of the navy. The reduction of Charleston would have to be a joint effort by British land and sea forces. The failure of either to achieve its objective would more than likely result in the failure of the entire operation. If Clinton’s army cut off Charleston from the mainland by laying siege lines across Charleston neck, the effort would be of no avail if rebel ships could still sail up the Ashley and Cooper Rivers or enter and leave the harbor at will. Supplies would continue to flow into the city and an avenue would remain open for Lincoln’s army to escape if necessary . Likewise, British naval control of the harbor offered no advantage if Lincoln’s army possessed the ability to retreat inland to a more secure position. In the watery expanse of the South Carolina lowcountry, British army operations were tied even more directly to the navy in terms of transport and supply. While no longer confined to transports, Clinton’s troops depended on the seamen of the Royal Navy to move them along h 50 / A GALLANT DEFENSE and across the numerous waterways that lay before Charleston. Meanwhile , provision ships, or victuallers, stationed in the North Edisto, continued to feed the soldiers. When the army moved inland, the navy’s flatboats and galleys carried their supplies up the various creeks and rivers.1 In the days after they came ashore, British troops fanned out across Johns Island and found no sign of the rebels. On Johns Island, Clinton ’s initial focus became the post at Stono Ferry on the upper Stono, the principal crossing to the mainland from Johns Island. On 14 February , Clinton ordered the 33rd regiment and Hessian jaegers to move toward the ferry. Captain Johann Ewald of the jaegers reported that the Americans “had stationed a strong corps in the vicinity of Stono Ferry” and that they seemed “determined to contest [their] crossing of the river.” Along the march, the jaegers captured a young slave boy, whom they hoped would guide them since they had no maps of the area. According to Ewald, “this boy spoke such a poor dialect that he was extremely hard to understand.”2 Their difficulty in communicating with him almost brought them to disaster. As the Hessian advance guard neared Stono Ferry, the youth directed them to a causeway made of logs and stone, which, after crossing a swamp on the south bank of the Stono, led directly to the crossing at the ferry. The British and Hessians reached the end of the causeway to discover that they were within firing distance of American cavalry and infantry fortified on high ground on the opposite bank. Captain Hinrichs admitted later that it gave him a “shudder” to think of their situation on the causeway where the Americans could have cut the detachment to pieces. They had run headlong into the enemy with little or no room to maneuver. Their only option was to fall back on the pathway as quickly as they could. Meanwhile , the Americans on the north bank of the Stono were equally surprised to encounter an enemy force and made no effort to fire on the British and Hessian troops on the causeway across the river. Captain Ewald could scarcely believe that the Americans did not attack them.3 The Americans at Stono Ferry were most likely a detachment from Colonel Daniel Horry’s command, which Lincoln had recalled from Sheldon on the Saltketcher River. Horry resolved “to discover the Enemy’s movements” and “give them all the annoyance and check” in [18.119.131...

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