Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President

Almost Free

ALMOST FREE Sadat said the political maneuvers in the Arab world were just shouting; that his major concern was restraining the adverse reaction among Egyptians toward their Arab brothers. . . . He said in the Arab world that we need only deal with Saudi Arabia. The Arab condemnations would never be able to change history; that history had already been written by me, him, and Begin. And then he said, “That man [Begin] has ‘chang-ed’ for the better.” DIARY, APRIL 24, 1979 The confrontations with the Iranians over the hostages and with the Soviets concerning Afghanistan were not my only responsibilities in that part of the world. I was also trying to preserve the benefits of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and to protect these two agreements against attacks from outside and from within the two countries. A period of euphoria had followed the signing of the treaty in March 1979; for the first time Sadat and Begin were able to communicate in a constructive and harmonious way. In our regular telephone conversations, Sadat seemed quite certain that he could work out any further difficulties with the Israelis. He felt there was no reason to be concerned about Arab threats to disrupt the peace process. Nevertheless, the drumfire of criticism continued—against Sadat from other Arab nations and against Begin within Israel. A stream of condemnatory resolutions designed to obstruct the Camp David process emanated from the United Nations, most of them aimed at Israel. Sometimes we had our hands full trying to deal with these attacks on Israel and at the same time to uphold the parts of the agreement that called for the protection of Palestinian rights. In spite of my differences with Begin over the 500 terms of the negotiations, I wanted to see him stay in office and use his strength to implement the more difficult aspects of the Israeli commitments : to Egypt, concerning withdrawal from the Sinai; and to the inhabitants of the West Bank, concerning self rule. I had decided to appoint Robert Strauss as special negotiator for the Middle East, to relieve me and Cy Vance of the day-to-day work and also of some of the political burdens of dealing with such a sensitive and often controversial subject. At first Vance disagreed strongly, but eventually he accepted the idea. There’s a general feeling that Begin’s government is going to go under in the next 60 days because of dissatisfaction in Israel concerning economics, and also because of Begin’s health. We don’t think this will be good for the peace prospects. Had a long discussion about the Palestinian–UN resolution, and how we could move forward toward peace without committing political suicide. My own preference is that Strauss take charge of dealing with the Israelis, American Jews, and Arabs. Cy said he’d just as soon resign if he was going to be a figurehead, but I think later on he cooled off a little. It’s obvious to me that there’s no advantage for me or Vance to be in the forefront of this difficult issue. We can set the policy, and Strauss can carry it out and deal with these diverse groups with more political impunity than I can. DIARY, AUGUST 3, 1979 All this was easier said than done. As had been the case since I first became President, there seemed to be no way I could stay out of Middle East affairs. Only ten days after I wrote the above entry, our Ambassador to the United Nations, Andy Young, as President of the Security Council, met in his apartment with the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He notified Israel’s United Nations Ambassador about the meeting, and the information immediately became public. State Department officials felt that Andy should have informed them more frankly about his actions. American Jewish leaders felt that we were attempting to recognize or negotiate with the PLO, and black leaders believed that Ambassador Young had been unjustly condemned for merely doing his duty as leader of the Security Council. During the furor following this incident, Andy resigned and I appointed his deputy, Donald McHenry, to take his place. Andy had not violated the United States agreement with Israel concerning the PLO, but he should have informed the Secretary of State more fully about the controversial meeting. A mountain was made ALMOST FREE 501 [18.188.20.56] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 23...