Brokered Boundaries: Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times

3. The Rise of Anti-Immigrant Times

58 Chapter 3 The Rise of Anti-Immigrant Times W hatever goals and motivations immigrants may have in migrating , their brokering of boundaries and construction of identities depend strongly on the context of reception they encounter in the United States (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 2006). In this chapter, we argue that circumstances in the United States have not evolved in ways that favor a blurring of boundaries between immigrants and natives. On the contrary, economic, social, and political conditions have shifted so as to harden categorical divisions between immigrants and natives. Economically, the long postwar boom came to an end in the 1970s and gave way to an era of rising inequality that ended with economic collapse in 2008, leaving the United States far removed from the non-zerosum economy that Alba (2009) posits as a critical precursor to widespread assimilation and boundary-blurring. Socially, in recent years immigrants have been framed in public rhetoric and media coverage as a threat to American culture and society, and as a result the salience of the line between natives and foreigners has increased rather than decreased . Politically, a series of harsh anti-immigrant policies, unusual in their scale and severity, have been implemented to promote systematic discrimination not only against unauthorized migrants but against legal permanent residents as well. Ironically, however, these repressive policies did not reduce undocumented migration but led to an accumulation of undocumented migrants living north of the border. The end result is a context of reception that is more hostile to immigrants than any time since the Great Depression. The Zero-sum economy An important determinant of natives’ openness to immigrants’ assimilation and boundary crossing is their own sense of economic security. Rise of Anti-Immigrant Times 59 When people feel confident about their prospects for continued employment and ample earnings, they naturally tend to feel less threatened by potential competitors and are less likely to impose mechanisms of exclusion or discrimination on foreigners or other socially defined out-groups. Unfortunately, over the past several decades the prospects for employment and earnings have been anything but sanguine for most Americans . Although a minority of households did extremely well up at least until the economic collapse of 2008, the vast majority saw their economic circumstances steadily deteriorate. Figure 3.1 begins our consideration of economic trends by documenting the singular rise in income inequality in the United States since the late 1960s (using data from U.S. Bureau of the Census 2009). Whereas in 1968 the Gini coefficient for income inequality stood at a record low level of 0.386, thereafter it steadily rose to peak at 0.470 in 2006, a remarkable increase of 22 percent over three decades. By 2006 it was as if the equalizing gains of the New Deal had been wiped out. Indeed, by then the distribution of U.S. income was more unequal than at any time since 1929. Figure 3.1 Household income inequality in the united states Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2009). 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 Gini Coefficient 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year 60 Brokered Boundaries What this increase in inequality meant for American households in practical terms is suggested by figure 3.2, which shows the share of income earned by the top quintile compared with the share earned by the next two quintiles combined (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2009). If positions in the socioeconomic hierarchy are to open up for immigrants with the retirement of the baby boom generation, as Richard Alba (2009) and Dowell Myers (2007) suggest, then most of the openings are likely to occur in these two middle segments of the income distribution. As can be seen, however, the earnings of these two classes have not fared well in recent decades. Whereas the top and the next two quintiles accounted for about the same fraction of total U.S. income in 1970, 42 to 43 percent, their fortunes steadily diverged over the ensuing decades. By 2006 the top quintile was earning 51 percent of total income, whereas the next two quintiles together earned just 37 percent. Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine those living in the middle two fifths of the income distribution feeling secure enough to perceive a non-zero-sum economy with respect to immigrants. Figure 3...