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Index Boldface numbers refer to figures and tables 339 accountability, institutional, 331–32 administrative studies, 184 Africa, field experiments in. See coethnicity and trust; social networks Afrobarometer survey project, 42 Ahn, Toh-Kyeong, 102 Almond, Gabriel, 310, 318 altruism, 19–20, 30–31, 36, 37, 49 annuity share as trust persistence indicator, 258, 259–60, 265–66, 272, 273, 274–75 Anthony, Denise, 151–52 Arrow, Kenneth, 10 Ashraf, Nava, 96 assurance vs. trust, 17 attitudinal vs. structural sources of trust, 324, 328 Australian student study sample, 23, 27 authenticity of a promise, 222 authority and social network status, 116, 287 backward induction models, 101 Balzac, Honoré de, 263, 282n16 Bandiera, Oriana, 114–15 Bandura, Albert, 184–85 bankruptcy law, 235–37, 239 Barankay, Iwan, 114–15 behavior expectations in group-based trust, 19–20, 35–36 belief, trust as, 54–55, 59n1 Berg, Joyce, 65 Berg game, 32 betweenness social network centrality measure, 75–76, 78, 80, 80–81, 82 Blau, Peter, 209 Bohnet, Iris, 96 Boldizar, Janet, 19 borrowers. See debtors Bourgeault, Ivy, 152 Brewer, Marilynn, 18, 36 bridging social capital, 67, 69–70 brokerage of social capital, 69–70, 78, 80 Burt, Ronald, 7, 69, 195, 234 capitation method, medical services payments, 150 Cárdenas, Juan Camilo, 113 Carpenter, Jeffrey, 114 case studies of self-organized resource regimes, 115–16 character and creditworthiness, 221, 222–24, 243 Charness, Gary, 96, 103 Chicago study. See neighborhood trust civic association, 4, 312, 322–23, 331 civic culture, 310–11, 313–14, 315–16, 322–24. See also democracy and trust Clark, Mary, 330 Clark, Terry, 207 class-based encapsulated interest, 132–46 Claxton, Gary, 175 Cleary, Matthew, 1, 324, 330 coethnicity and trust: and anonymity in game, 46, 62n19; and class-based encapsulated interest, 133; competence rationale, 56–58; conclusion, 58–59; diversity’s effect on neighborhood trust, 185, 187, 194, 195, 203–4, 205, 209; experimental design, 43–48, 60–61n9–17, 60n3; incentives rationale, 50–55; introduction , 42–45; and norms of cooperation , 6; other-regarding preferences rationale, 48–50; overview, 2, 3; results, 50, 51–52, 53–54, 57–58 cognitive strategies: in evaluation of state institutions, 286–90, 298–304; for physicians in managed care situations , 158, 168–70, 172. See also stereotype-based trust cohesion, neighborhood, and collective efficacy, 193 Coleman, James, 68 collective efficacy, neighborhood, 184–85, 186–87, 193, 203, 208 common-pool resource (CPR) games, 93–94, 107–13, 115–16 communication, face-to-face, 103–4, 109–10, 111, 112–13, 119n5 communities and group-level social capital, 66–67. See also neighborhood trust Community Survey (CS), 188–89 competence rationale, 43, 56–58 concentrated poverty and neighborhood trust, 194–95 Concept of Law (Hart), 135 conditional cooperators, 101–2 confidence vs. trust, 129–30 conflicts of interest, physicians in managed care, 161–63, 168–70, 173–75 conscription data as social capital indicator, 264–65, 268–69, 270, 271 context: experimental, 94–107, 112–13, 117–18, 118n2, 184; in interpersonal trust, 316–17. See also social networks Cook, Karen, 127, 130, 142, 183–84, 313–14 cooperation and trust: and assurance vs. trust, 17; common-pool resource games, 107–13; conclusion, 117–18; conditional vs. unconditional cooperation , 101–2; cost-benefit calculation , 3; in democratic civic culture, 313–14, 315–16, 322–24; and formal vs. informal institutions, 137–38, 142–46; and generalized vs. personal trust, 139–40; inequality’s disincentives for cooperation, 143–44; introduction, 91–94; public goods games, 93, 97–107, 110, 114, 118n1; and reciprocity expectation, 30; research methods comparison, 113–17; self-interest as basis for, 312, 314; social norms role in, 3, 6; summary of trust experiments, 94–97. See also institutions; reciprocity core vs. penumbra, institutional, 135–37, 147n5 corruption, governmental, 143, 325, 326, 327–28 cost-benefit calculation for cooperation , 3 court system and trust: conclusion, 303–4; experience vs. nonexperience and trust in government, 294–303; introduction, 286–87; methods, 290–97, 306n3–4; overview, 11–12; results and analysis, 297–303; trial verdicts as social capital indicator, 265, 268–69, 271 Cox, James, 95, 96 Crawford, Sue, 103 credit and creditworthiness: complications of credit, 238–41, 244n11; conclusion , 241–43; creditor’s network, 232–34; debtor’s network, 229–30; financial status, debtor’s, 230–32; formal-contractual relationship, 226–29; goals of debtor and creditor, 224–25, 238–39; individual character , 221, 222–24, 243; informal relationships , 222–24, 225...

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