Choice Over Time

2. Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought

· 2 · Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought JON ELSTER MOST WORK on intertemporal choice has been done within philosophy , psychology, and economics. Much of it is surveyed elsewhere in this book. In this chapter I discuss how issues of myopia, deferred gratification, and self-control have been discussed within political theory. I first consider political constitutions as examples of imperfect rationality, that is, as devices of precommitment against future weakness of will. To the extent that constitutions are considered as devices, that bind later generations, we may inquire into the optimal tightness of the bounds as well as the optimal difficulty of untying them. Next I survey at some length the views of Alexis de Tocqueville-of all political theorists probably the one who attached most importance to problems of intertemporal choice. He discussed how political institutions affect the general ability of the citizens to defer gratification, and-probably the most original aspect of this thinking-how the ability to defer gratification in one part of life affects the ability to do so in others. Constitutional Self-binding Most Western democracies have written constitutions. (Great Britain and Israel are the main exceptions.I) Their task is to set up the ma1For a survey, see V. Bogdanov, Constitutions in Democratic Politics, Aldershot: Gower, 1988. Yet both the British and the Israeli political systems have quasi35 36 Historical Overview chinery of government and to protect basic rights and freedoms. Constitutional clauses differ from ordinary laws in two ways. First, they are supposed to deal with more basic or fundamental issues.2 If this were the only difference between the constitution and other laws, there would not seem to be much point in having one. In virtually all cases, however, constitutions also differ in being more difficult to change. Whereas ordinary legislation usually requires no more than a single majority vote, constitutional changes have to pass more difficult hurdles. Qualified majorities, ranging from 60 percent to 75 percent, are very common.3 In federal systems, a qualified majority of the states may have to give their consent. Often, constitutions impose delays that prevent changes from being made on short notice. The new clause may have to be passed by several successive parliaments or, as in Norway, be proposed during one parliament and passed by the following one. Some constitutions (such as the Norwegian one) impose both qualified majorities and delays; others (such as the Swedish one) requires only delays4; still others (such as the West German and U.S. ones), only qualified majorities; while New Zealand appears to be unique in that here "only ordinary legislative efforts are required to supplement, modify or repeal the Constitution ."5 constitutional elements. For Britain, see, for instance, the practice described in footnote 3. In Israel, many basic laws contain entrenchment clauses similar to constitutional amendment clauses. 20bviously, the distinction between basic and nonbasic is anything but hard and fast. In the Fifth French Republic, for instance, the electoral system is not mentioned in the constitution. In consequence, parliament is free to stipulate proportional representation and single-member districts according to the interests of the current majority. lIn the Independence Constitution of Kenya, the majority required to change certain parts of the document was set at nine tenths of the vote in the Senate (J. Jaconelli, "Majority Rule and Special Majorities." Public Law, 1989, pp. 587-616, at p. 600). As observed by Alexander Hamilton (The Federalist, no. 75), similarly difficult hurdles may be created by requiring a qualified majority of the total composition of the body, irrespective of how many are actually present to vote. When turnout is traditionally low, even a Simple majority of the electorate may prove difficult to obtain. 4A similar practice obtains in Great Britain: "Under the Parliament Act 1911, as amended by the Parliament Act 1949, a non-money bill can be passed into law over the opposition of the House of Lords if it has been passed by simple majority in two consecutive sessions of the House of Commons and one year has elapsed between the second reading of the Bill in the Commons in the first sessions its third reading in the Commons in the second session." (Jaconelli, "Majority Rule and Special Majorities," p.597.) sJ.N Eule, "Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate," American Bar Journal Foundation, 1987, pp. 379-459, at p. 394). Eule goes on to say, however, that "even in such a system ... there remain moral and political restraints on the legislative alteration of constitutional doctrine...