In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Heinrich Meier's Straussian Refutation of Revelation Carson Holloway Is belief in divine revelation reasonable? Such belief surely cannot command simply rational assent, in the sense of a conviction that follows upon rational demonstration : belief in revelation depends in part upon accepting historical claims from the distant past that are no longer subject to independent verification. Indeed, religious believers themselves do not even claim this kind of rationality for their convictions. Hence their emphasis on the need for faith—that is, the need to trust God’s revelation and, in addition, to trust the church or community of believers he has constituted to communicate his revelation.1 But if believers in revelation cannot demonstrate their claims and do not even claim to try to do so, can their position at least be presented as a reasonable one in a less demanding sense? That is, can belief in revelation stake a claim to intellectual respectability equal to that of rival positions, or one at least sufficiently within the bounds of reasonableness that it cannot simply be dismissed as obvious delusion? This question has been pressed with greater than usual vigor and openness in recent years, especially by opponents of revealed religion who have sought to expose it as a mere medley of irrational beliefs, unworthy of continued vitality in an enlightened age.2 This question is undoubtedly an important one. It matters for us as individuals. Revealed religion makes claims—about man’s ultimate origins, his purpose, and his destiny—that seem impossible for a serious person to ignore. At least, the claims would be hard to ignore, again, if belief in revelation is reasonable in the sense 1 18 C ar son Holloway of rationally plausible. The question is also important for the quality of our political life. If belief in revelation is seen as simply irrational, then believers’ arguments about how best to organize our common life, their conceptions of justice and the good, will be easily dismissed; while, on the other hand, if that belief is seen as at least plausible, believers’ public arguments will be accorded more respect and will probably have more public impact. As is often the case, however, the most important questions are not always treated with the seriousness they deserve; and the most well-known arguments are not always the ones most worthy of our attention. I propose to investigate a critique of the reasonableness of revelation found not in one of the recent bestsellers but, instead, in the much less widely known work of the German philosopher Heinrich Meier— specifically, that to be found in his book Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem . In Meier’s argument we encounter not a polemicist but a philosopher sharing his meditations on this question, which are in turn derived from his long and careful study of one of the foremost figures in political philosophy in the twentieth century. Such a study is also of interest because of Strauss’s reputation as a friend of traditional religion. In taking his point of departure from Strauss, Meier is not beginning from a reflexive hostility to religious belief. Such considerations add a certain weight to his ultimate dismissal of revelation as unable to justify itself at the bar of reason. In this chapter I offer a critique of Meier’s treatment of revelation or, rather, I attempt a refutation of his Straussian refutation of revelation. I will first deal with some preliminary matters, which are necessary in order to clarify Meier’s argument and hence the nature of the disagreement. Then I will present what I take to be the key argument in Meier’s refutation. Finally I will offer my response. Preliminary Observations: Meier’s Strauss on Reason and Revelation Meier presents his argument as an interpretation of the thought of Leo Strauss on the theologico-political problem. In doing so he challenges two common conceptions of Strauss. The first is that Strauss was not himself a political philosopher but, instead, only a student of political philosophy, albeit a brilliant one. On this view (which Strauss himself probably encouraged to some extent), he was a scholar or commentator on the ideas of others but did not have any philosophic project of his own. In contrast, Meier contends with great plausibility that Strauss was himself a philosopher and that he spent his life grappling with what he took to be the central question: the theologico-political problem or the problem of the relationships among politics, religion, and...

Share