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Introduction On MARch 15, 1951, some eighteen months after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a small ceremony took place at the Museum Koenig to mark the official establishment of a Foreign Office [Auswärtiges Amt]. The Museum Koenig was a natural history museum that had been pressed into service by West German authorities to address the lack of office and meeting space in Bonn four years after the Second World War. In September 1948 it had hosted the opening session of the Parliamentary Council that drafted the West German constitution, or Basic Law. After the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the late summer of 1949 the museum would be used as temporary housing for various parts of the government, including the Chancellery and some of the offices that would be incorporated into the Auswärtiges Amt.1 Now, in a building filled with taxidermied animals, the diplomats assembled to meet their newly appointed foreign minister, Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer took his place at the head of a reception line, greeted his subordinates , and exchanged pleasantries with a few pre-selected officials. The French High Commissioner in Germany, André François-Poncet, reported that until then some of the higher functionaries present had enjoyed little or even no contact with their “inaccessible boss,” even though they had been in government service for months already working on foreign policy issues. Adenauer then made a speech in which he stressed how significant it was that the Western Occupation Powers had finally allowed West Germany to set up a Foreign Office and conduct its own diplomacy. He emphasized that he could not remain foreign minister over the long term, but that he would do 4 A D e n A u e R ’ S F O R e I G n O F F I c e his utmost to return Germany to the family of European nations on a basis of equality and mutual respect. Finally, he cautioned that the Federal Republic’s representatives in foreign countries needed to exercise restraint if they were going to win trust abroad. The same afternoon,Adenauer spoke with the press. He said that despite the new Foreign Ministry, in the immediate future the Federal Republic would not become very active in foreign policy. Due to the distrust of Germany by much of the international community, it seemed more advisable for the time being to exercise a “refined sense of restraint” [vornehme Zurückhaltung]. He then added that it was appropriate to maintain the structure of the pre-1945Auswärtiges Amt with some modifications since, he asserted, the old “Wilhelmstraße” had never been a Nazi institution, and it would be useful to retain some foreign policy traditions. François-Poncet noted that this comment must have pleased many of those present at the earlier ceremony, who themselves had joined the German diplomatic service before 1945, served during the Third Reich, and then, in ever-increasing numbers, found employment in the Federal Republic. However, Adenauer also said that it was wrong to select West Germany’s new diplomatic representatives “only from the stocks of the old school.” Despite the need for experience and tradition, a new start was also necessary.2 This account of the opening ceremony for the new Foreign Office and the related press conference nicely illustrates the main themes of this study, which describes the creation and early history of that ministry through 1955, the period Adenauer served as foreign minister, and the related issue of how and why the Western Occupation Powers granted the Federal Republic the right to conduct an independent foreign policy. The creation of the Foreign Office tells us much about the possibilities and limits of professional diplomacy in the mid-twentieth century. It also clearly illustrates three of the central themes in the early history of the Federal Republic of Germany: the integration of the new state into the international community, the cooptation of “old” German elites and traditions by the political system, and the creation of that new system itself. This study argues that, despite an improvised start and a considerable continuity of practice and personnel with pre-1945 Germany, the changed international and domestic situation proved decisive in creating a ministry that could help to implement new directions in German foreign policy. It also seeks to explore the interactions between international, political, and social history as well as to contribute to an increasing literature that bridges the gap between the pre...

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