Divine Law and Political Philosophy in Plato's "Laws"

Introduction

iNtroDuctioN For many years, scholars have regarded the Laws as Plato’s final proposal for practical political reform. While there is much to be learned from such an approach, it has failed to do justice to the dialogue’s central concern. What leading interpretations of the dialogue fail to appreciate is that Plato’s Laws is, first and foremost, an inquiry into divine law. It is the dialogue in which Plato directly and thematically explores what divine law is, how we come to know or believe in it, and how it shapes civic life. Moreover, it is the dialogue in which Plato demonstrates that the political philosopher has the authority to interpret or guide divine law. When read with attention to these themes and to the drama of the dialogue, the Laws provides an eye-opening analysis of divine law as well as a powerful defense of political rationalism. Plato’s inquiry into the relationship between political philosophy and divine law is not merely of scholarly or historical interest. Today, from North America and Europe to India and Thailand, secular rationalist governments and judicial authorities have been challenged by increasingly vigorous claims made on behalf of shari’a or divine law. As Plato knew from his own experience, the presence of divine law as a political force raises important theoretical and practical challenges to those who believe that reason should be the principal guide of politics and law. Proponents of divine law say that the law provides authoritative and comprehensive guidance because it is based on a profound wisdom regarding justice and the common good. Some of those who reflect on divine law say that the law consists solely in what is known through a prophecy that has been given to a select person or persons. Others say that divine law includes both positive revelation and what is known through a powerful religious experience that has not been experienced universally. Still others say that what is known through revelation and faith should be supplemented by what is known through the rational faculties that are available to all. But all of these believers in divine law tend to agree that even though reason may be able to recognize the wisdom that underlies divine law, reason cannot derive or disclose that wisdom on its own. Revealed law is a miracle, an uncanny sign of a divine providence that human reason cannot anticipate 4 DiviNe Law aND PoLiticaL PhiLosoPhy iN PLato’s LAWS or elaborate by itself. Because human reason, unassisted by revelation and faith, cannot provide a complete and undistorted vision of the highest goals of politics and law, it should not be trusted to set or pursue those goals without guidance from divine law.1 The far-reaching claims that current defenders of divine law make about the very basis of political and legal authority have evoked few, if any, responses from contemporary theorists who would defend political rationalism. In the past, modern political philosophers did not ignore the controversy. The political philosophers who helped to found modernity pursued a common strategy as they sought to liberate both philosophy and politics from the need to rely on revelation or on any authorities that rely on religious faith. These early modern philosophers began by arguing that we cannot have genuine, rational knowledge regarding the nature of God or His purposes. They argued that we do not know the ends to which God directs nature as a whole or what happens to the soul after death (e.g., Descartes, Meditations, Number 4, 55; Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 31; Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter 3, 24, 29; Chapter 6, 11–13; Chapter 12, 10–12; Chapter 18, 7). Putting aside the quest for knowledge of these matters, they sought to turn philosophy’s attention away from theological and teleological questions and to direct it instead toward the mastery of material nature for the sake of “relief of man’s estate” (Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Book I, V, 11; also, Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 5, 21–22). At the same time, the early modern political philosophers sought to establish an increasingly complete and consistent account of the material universe. They argued that in the past most human beings lived under the sway of superstition. Lacking knowledge of the natural causes of events and gripped by powerful fears and hopes, the vast majority of people sought help from an imaginary multitude of spiritual beings and invisible powers (Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 12; Spinoza, Theologico-Political...