Embattled Ecumenism: The National Council of Churches, the Vietnam War, and the Trials of the Protestant Left

6—Building an Ecumenical Peace Witness, 1966

C h a p t e r S i x Building an Ecumenical Peace Witness, 1966 It took weeks of debate before President Johnson authorized a short bombing pause over North Vietnam, to begin Christmas Eve 1965. Antiwar liberals had lobbied hard for it, and Secretary of Defense McNamara tried to convince him to extend it indefinitely. Privately, McNamara had lost confidence in the prospect of a swift military victory. With 184,000 American troops engaged and more on the way, he foresaw a protracted war that did not promise to result in America’s objectives. Therefore, he persuaded Johnson to combine diplomatic efforts with an extended pause aimed at precipitating talks.1 The NCC entered the holiday season with prayerful anticipation. Its support for a bombing pause and all-out push for negotiations had finally found a willing White House. Council President Mueller wired Johnson to praise his statesmanship in taking this risk for peace.2 Convinced that the halt endangered U.S. troops, however, the Joint Chiefs pressured Johnson throughout to resume bombing. So antiwar forces, including churches, rallied voices behind sustaining it. This led to the birth of perhaps the most prominent antiwar organization for religiously motivated people: Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV).3 In a small NCC office, a group gathered to mobilize quick church support for the pause. They generated lists of clergy across the United States, many known from shared civil rights efforts, and used 138 E m b a t t l e d E c u m e n i s m seminary volunteers to contact them about planning grassroots activities urging negotiations. A few weeks of nightly phone calls produced about 165 budding local committees, which put pressure on Washington in a variety of ways.4 A notable feat, given that many clergy feared the condemnation such action might draw from their congregations. The NCC provided CALCAV’s physical and financial launching pad and would sustain it for years. CALCAV gave religious people who opposed the war a separate and independent organization through which to express their sentiments freely outside of their more restrictive religious structures. It could carry out interfaith projects at will through local chapters and at the national level. Conversely, the NCC could not act without approval from its governing bodies. And unlike CALCAV, the Council lacked direct access to the grass roots because its structural design permitted communication with denominational boards, not parishioners. yet, the NCC could mobilize denominational consensus against the war, which CALCAV was powerless to do. Therefore, while frustration sometimes erupted between the two organizations, their varied roles, access, and abilities complemented each other. CALCAV’s founders originally named their group the National Emergency Committee of Clergy Concerned About Vietnam (CCAV). This connoted what they thought would be a short-term emergency action to rally clergy behind extending the bombing pause, resistance to future escalation, and negotiations.5 They also aimed to generate a different image of the dissenter. The Christian Century had high hopes. “This program . . . may seem modest; but once it is under way it can achieve that massiveness and momentum which enabled the clergy to help turn the tide in the civil rights struggle.”6 Since CCAV’s objectives fell within the NCC’s recent policy mandate, Associate General Secretary David Hunter persuaded the Council to provide its organizers with an office and a phone line.7 It also agreed to cover CCAV expenses until it could reimburse the Council, and process donations on its behalf so it could benefit from the NCC’s tax exempt status . This financial arrangement spawned future tensions.8 Still the Council provided CCAV/CALCAV with a safety net for years. Toward the end of January, President Johnson grew frustrated with Hanoi’s unresponsiveness. An NCC delegation met with Secretary of State Rusk to urge patience and perseverance.9 But their plea proved fruitless. Johnson resumed bombing. A poll released the day of his decision showed that most Americans would support increases in bombing and troop Building an Ecumenical Peace Witness, 1966 139 deployments up to five hundred thousand.10 The failed diplomatic effort embittered the president, making him resistant to future suggestions for bombing halts and causing McNamara to lose clout inside the oval office. While the administration’s attempts to spark negotiations may have been genuine, its diplomatic ineptitude became a saboteur. To the Century, renewed bombing made a mockery...