Embattled Ecumenism: The National Council of Churches, the Vietnam War, and the Trials of the Protestant Left

4—Awakening a Loyal Opposition, 1964–July 1965

C h a p t e r F o u r Awakening a Loyal opposition, 1964–July 1965 High Stakes in the 1964 Election Nothing seemed more crucial than the Civil Rights Bill being filibustered in Congress—at least not for the NCC’s staff during the first seven months of 1964. The Council channeled considerable effort and treasure into mobilizing church-based support for its passage. The Johnson administration praised the NCC’s effectiveness. Ecumenists appreciated Johnson’s leadership and legislative skill on civil rights as well. Here was a president with whom they could partner on issues of mutual concern. His Great Society agenda and the ecumenical vision of the Responsible Society shared several domestic objectives, including racial and economic justice. The new president’s approach to international affairs was still unknown, however. Even though Johnson assured the UN that he would seek an end to the Cold War, church leaders remained uncertain.1 In March, the old cold warrior Reinhold Niebuhr revealed his skepticism . “Everyone seems to agree that the new President’s exploitation of the Kennedy legacy in civil rights has been brilliant. . . . President Johnson’s foreign policy, on the other hand, is much less than brilliant. Aspects of it threaten to be catastrophic.” Niebuhr fretted about Johnson’s 80 E m b a t t l e d E c u m e n i s m attempt to be more hawkish than the Republicans on Cuba in order to avoid accusations of being “soft on Castro.” Niebuhr also questioned his uncoordinated handling of political instability in South Vietnam and the dearth of White House information, which left citizens ignorant and dependent upon blind trust in their government.2 NiebuhrhadidentifiedaprecipitousrealitythatforeshadowedJohnson’s handling of the war. Unbeknownst to many beyond Johnson’s innermost circle, his administration was already avoiding negotiations and bending toward Americanizing and militarizing the conflict. To Johnson, negotiating with communists was a weak and unmanly option. He and his closest advisers were trying to protect their political credibility via their Vietnam policies. Throughout 1964 and into early 1965, Niebuhr and a handful of other realists pressed their critiques into print. These gadflies included journalist Walter Lippman, political scientist Hans Morgenthau, and senators William Fulbright, Hubert Humphrey, and Mike Mansfield. But they were too few, and ultimately, too quiet. So, also, were the vast majority of U.S. allies overseas, who saw America’s escalation in Vietnam as folly. Like many domestic leaders, they shied away from confronting the mercurial president for fear of losing his support on other matters of concern. With the exceptions of Niebuhr, Bennett, and a few others, most church leaders (including those within the NCC) knew little about the Vietnam situation. In this they reflected the general ignorance of most Americans. Church leaders’ growing uncertainty about Johnson inspired them to pay more attention as the election year proceeded, but their learning curve lagged too far behind Johnson’s steps toward escalation to have much influence on events.3 A month earlier, in February 1964, the Chinese and Russian communist parties feuded bitterly when China accused the Soviets of betraying true communism. This taught attentive church people a lesson about communist diversity.4 They saw that communism did not operate as a monolithic bloc, that race and economic differentiations between communist nations mattered, and that communism’s appeal in developing nations hinged upon economic deprivation and nationalist desires. As a result, the Christian Century and Christianity and Crisis appealed for a policy that treated communist governments situationally and individually. To many ecumenists , outdated Cold War attitudes were precipitating policies out of proportion to real security dangers and fostering unnecessary ill will within both political and ecumenical communities. Church leaders wondered Awakening a Loyal opposition, 1964–July 1965 81 what Johnson would do as the presidential campaign escalated. “Will the Administration be driven to take ‘know-nothing’ positions in order to avoid the suspicion that it is soft on communism?” Bennett queried.5 As it turned out, Johnson tried to distinguish himself from his Republican rival, Barry Goldwater, by becoming the moderate voice of reason. Compared to Goldwater, who wore Cold War extremism as a badge of honor, Johnson could easily paint himself as the peace candidate while adhering to a traditional containment policy. This attracted the NCC, given that its International Affairs Commission was directing a nationwide lay education effort on peace sponsored by its denominational members. This...